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1. Introduction	  	  
Beside theoretical frameworks for strategic decision-making, such as “transaction cost 
theory” and “resource- based view” (RBV), the “real options approach” (ROA) has gained 
more attention in management research. Since Myers (1977) introduced the term “real 
options” in 1977, the real options perspective has developed over the last 35 years. 
Sourcing in financial options theory, the real options approach has been applied to 
questions of strategy and managerial decision-making. The main advantage of the real 
options perspective is the integration of uncertainty to the strategic framework. In response 
to the fact that firms are confronted with an uncertain environment and future, option 
theory provides a concept, which embeds this uncertainty as an opportunity. Caused by the 
awareness, that uncertainty involves the possibility of flexibility, the firm can realise 
valuable future opportunities. The uncertainty is perceived to be valuable, due to the fact 
that it provides managers the possibility to incorporate new gathered information flexibly 
in the decision making process, which results in a constant improvement of the information 
basis for decisions. 
Although scientific research has been conducted for the real option approach to joint 
ventures (Kogut 1991, Chi/ McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, Folta/ Johnson/ 
O’Brien 2006, Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010, Cuypers/ Martin 2010, etc.) and  
licensing (Kulatilaka/ Lin 2006, Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009, etc.), the application of real 
option analysis to franchising represents a gap in scientific research, which lacks an 
extension in order to better understand franchising decisions. In dependence on conducted 
research for joint ventures as real options (Kogut 1991, Chi/ McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, 
Reuer/ Tong 2005), franchising is going to be assumed as a form of sequential market 
entry, and therefore might be seen a real option to defer immediate acquisition of a local 
partner. Following this logic franchising might be seen as a real option to expand, hence a 
real growth option.  
Despite the need to analyse franchising itself as a real option, which would require a wider 
range of available data and qualitative research, this thesis should focus specifically on real 
option clauses in franchising contracts. The contractual arrangements between two 
franchising partners are individual in every case, but the occurrence of real option clauses 
in such contracts gives us information about the possible relation and intentions of the two 
contract partners. In respect to real option theory those option clauses represent the 
 2 
contractual recorded arrangement between the franchising partners, which gives one party 
the right but not the obligation to exploit future opportunities. Therefore the option clause 
can be seen as the legally binding implementation of a real option. Consequently the clause 
is an instrument for a firm to assure a claim on future opportunities.  
The occurrence or absence of such option clauses in franchising contracts might give hints 
to the intentions of the contractual partners, as well as have implications on partners’ 
incentives.  
 
The thesis is structured into a theoretical part (Chapters 3-5) and an empirical part (Chapter 
6). In the theoretical part the basic real options literature and considerations are presented 
and hypotheses for franchising are generated. In the empirical study those hypotheses will 
be tested. 
In Chapter 3, “Real Option Theory”, the main principles of financial and real options 
theory are explained. As real options theory sources in financial option theory, it is feasible 
to get a brief review of the main concepts of this theory. However the focus will be set on 
real options, mentioning the assumptions of real options approach, the different types of 
real options, the basics of real options valuation, and the application of real options 
concept to strategic investment.  
The next section (Chapter 4, “Real Options in Alliances”) is going to present a part of the 
conducted real options research for alliances. Two directions of real options research in 
alliances will be the centres of attention. Firstly, the investigation of entry modes (joint 
ventures (JVs) and licensing) as real options. Secondly, the usage of option clauses in JV 
contracts, international JV contracts and licensing agreements. Although the real options 
approach, with its incorporation of uncertainty, seems to be promising, the combination 
with other theories (transaction cost theory or resource- based view (RBV)) can enrich real 
options research.  
As the basic concepts of real option theory (Chapter 3, “Real Option Theory”) and the 
literature dealing with real options and alliances (Chapter 4, “Real Options in Alliances”) 
are introduced, the application of real options approach to franchising happens in Chapter 
5, “Franchising and the Real Options Approach”. A short overview of franchising and real 
option clauses in franchising contracts is given, before several hypotheses will be derived. 
The creation of the hypotheses and additional control variables is based upon the real 
options literature for alliances.  
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In the second part of this thesis (Chapter 6,“Empirical Study”), the theoretical 
considerations are tested in an empirical study. After a description of the measures used, 
and the most important frequencies, a factor analysis and a logistic regression are 
conducted.  
The aim of this thesis should be to identify conditions, influencing the existence of 
contractual clauses in franchising arrangements, in order to better understand the intentions 
of the franchisor by utilising real options approach. 
2. Methods	  
In order to get a basic understanding of the real options theory, the main principles of 
financial option theory need to be mentioned. Therefore a broad literature search (For 
instance via u:search1, JSTOR2, etc.) on the field of financial and real options has been 
conducted.  
Due to the fact that there exists hardly any literature dealing with the real options approach 
in franchising, it is necessary to draw analogies from existing real options literature for 
joint ventures and licensing. Through applying the main insights from real options research 
in alliances to franchising, the creation of hypotheses for franchising is possible.  
In the second part of this thesis, the hypotheses, derived from real options literature, will 
be tested empirically. Therefore a dataset of a research project („Eigentumsstrategie von 
Franchise- Unternehmen in Deutschland“), conducted by ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Josef 
Windsperger, is used. The data collected contains German franchising firms, which 
answered questions in order to analyse the factors influencing the choice of ownership 
strategy of the franchisor. The data will be analysed with the statistic software SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences) version 20.0. The statistical analysis comprises a 
factor analysis and a logistic regression. The results of the statistical testing, as well as the 
selected literature, should help to comprehend the basic principles of real options theory 
and the implications for franchisors’ to use real option clauses in their contracts. Moreover 
this thesis represents a first attempt to apply real options concepts, developed for joint 
venture (JVs) and licensing, to franchising.  
                                                
1 URL: 
http://search.obvsg.at/primo_library/libweb/action/search.do?mode=Basic&vid=UWI&tab=default_tab ; 
2 URL: http://www.jstor.org/ ; 
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3. Real	  Option	  Theory	  
3.1 Financial	  Options	  
In general an option can be defined as: “(…) the right, in an uncertain future, to pick 
whatever action will turn out to be ‘the best of’ two or more actions, as the uncertain future 
unfolds.”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.13).  
The emerging flexibility, from having the right to choose, represents one of the basic 
concepts of financial options theory. The right of choice withdraws implicitly the 
obligation to pick one action. Hence, “The buyer of an option receives the right but not the 
obligation to make the specified transaction.”(Figlewski/ Silber 1990, p.4).  
Options are useful devices in order to cope with uncertainty and are helpful instruments to 
reduce risk. A financial option is an instrument of derivative structure. Luenberger (1998) 
states that, “An option is a derivative security whose underlying asset is the asset that can 
be bought or sold (…)”(Luenberger 1998, p.319).  
The history of option- like deals dates back to ancient Greece and Rome, where the basic 
idea of a transaction with a pre-specified date and place to a fixed price already existed. In 
the early 18th century forward contracts were common in Japan on the first organized 
commodity exchange. During the tulip mania in the 17th century in Holland, those option- 
like instruments led to a collapse, due to too high contract prices. The modern history of 
financial options starts with the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848, which was the 
first commodity exchange for forward contracts in the U.S., with future contract trading in 
the 1860s. During the 19th century primarily agricultural commodities were subject of 
option contracts in England and the U.S.. In 1919 the formation of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) took place. A division of the CME, the International Monetary Market 
(IMM) began trading the first financial future contract in May 1972. In April 1973, the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) started its commercial operations. Up to 1973 
option contracts were traded on the Over the Counter Market (OTC). The linkage between 
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the CME in 1984 enhanced 
internationalization and in 1988 “(…) all major stock exchanges and future exchanges 
sponsored options trading (…)”(Figlewski/ Silber 1990, p.10). (Dubofsky 1992, Figlewski/ 
Silber 1990) 
 
During the long history of options, several different approaches in order to define financial 
options exist, for instance:  
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„On traite sur certain marchés des opérations en quelque sorte intermédiaires entre les 
opérations fermes et les opérations à prime, ce sont les options.“(Bachelier 1900, p.31) 
 
„An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy (or sell) an asset under specified 
terms. Usually there are a specified price and a specified period of time over which the 
option is valid.“(Luenberger 1998, p.319) 
 
“A financial option is an option to buy or sell a financial asset which already exists and is 
actively traded in a financial market in a standard form (stocks, shares, bonds, 
etc.).”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.13) 
 
“An option is defined as the right, without an associated symmetric obligation, to buy (if a 
call) or sell (if a put) a specified asset (e.g., common stock) by paying a prespecified price 
(the exercise or strike price) on or before a specified date (the expiration or maturity 
date).”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.69)  
 
3.2 Terminology	  
In this section a very brief overview of the most important terms and concepts of options 
theory is given, on the basis of Howell, Stark, Newton, Paxson, Cavus, Pereira and Patel 
(2001).  
3.2.1 Option	  Holder	  
The option holder is in possession of the right to acquire (call option) or to sell (put option) 
the option. 
3.2.2 Option	  Writer	  
The option writer has the obligation to acquire or to sell the option to the option holder to 
the ex ante or ex post negotiated conditions. 
3.2.3 Option	  Premium	  
The option premium is the price in order to acquire an option. As the option premium 
represents the price of the option itself, the original paid option premium is an irreversible 
expenditure.  
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3.2.4 Exercise	  Price	  or	  Strike	  Price	  
The exercise price or strike price is the price at which an option gives us the right to buy or 
to sell an asset. Usually the exercise price is fixed a priori, although in more complex 
option constructs, the exercise price happens to be variable, depending for instance on 
negotiations or on different pre-agreed determinants.  
3.2.5 Stock	  Price	  or	  Asset	  Price	  
The stock price or the asset price refers to the price of the underlying at a certain point in 
time. The difference in value between the stock price and the exercise price is an essential 
condition in order to gain additional value from exercising an option.  
3.2.6 Expiration	  Date	  
The expiration date represents the specific point in time, when an option expires. Therefore 
the contractual parties need to settle the duration of the option. The duration can be fixed a 
priori in the option contract, or can be interrelated to certain conditions or further 
negotiations. For European Call options it is the date when exercising the option is 
possible, due to the fact that European options have a fixed expiration date. According to 
real options for example it might be the possible date for new investments, the expiration 
date of a licence or a patent, the expected move of a competitor towards a new technology, 
etc..  
3.2.7 Underlying	  Asset	  
The underlying asset of the option defines the asset, which an option allows to buy or to 
sell. The parties have to agree on the quantity and class or form of their economical 
interactions, which means defining the underlying. Concerning real options the underlying 
for instance could be a revenue stream, a production operation, etc..  
3.2.8 Random	  Factor	  
The random factor represents “a variable whose random walk of value over time will drive 
the value of some derivative (such as a real option).”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ 
Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.5). As one of the basic ideas in option theory is the possible 
value change over time, the random factor allows us to observe this shifting in value by 
naming a certain variable. This variable might sometimes be hard to measure, but enables 
an approximation, which alleviates decision-making. In some cases the random factor 
equals the value of the underlying asset of the option. In financial options the random 
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factor would be the stock price, whereas in real options the random factor could be, for 
example, expected revenue streams, when holding the option to build up a new production 
facility. Further other random factors can influence the value of an asset, such as exchange 
rates, interest rates, etc.. Therefore the random factor is a value- driving factor for the 
option. 
3.2.9 Random	  Walk	  
According to the assumption that the value of the option changes over time in an 
unforeseeable way, random or value- driving factors are not constant. This phenomenon, 
the changing of the value of the random factor over time, is called the random walk. 
Consequently the value is as likely to fall as to increase during any future period of time.  
Random walk analysis is feasible under perfect competition.  
3.3 Call	  Options	  
In general the definition of a call option can be described as followed:  
A call option is “the right to acquire an asset at some future time for a cost which is known 
now, however much the asset’s market value may change meanwhile.”(Howell/ Stark/ 
Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.4).  
The call option happens to be profitable for the option holder as soon as the strike price 
will be exceeded by the price of the underlying. The option holder gains advantage from 
increasing volatility, due to the fact that she holds the right but not the obligation to buy 
the option.  
Further an option is called “in the money”, when the price of the underlying, sometimes 
also called stock price, is higher than the exercise price. In this situation an exercise of the 
option enables the option holder to gain profit from the option. The opposite situation 
occurs when an option is said to be “out of the money”, where the exercise price, or also 
called strike price, is higher than the stock price. In a circumstance of price equality, which 
means the exercise price equals the price of the underlying, the option is said to be “at the 
money”. (Dubofsky 1992, Dixit/ Pindyck 1994, Luenberger 1998) 
As a call option is the possibility and not the obligation to acquire, call options can be seen 
as the opportunity to get a free loan. Following this logic the value of a call option rises 
with the time to maturity and the interest rate. (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) 
Call options can take various forms, therefore the term call option should not only be 
associated with operations on financial markets. In respect to real options different call 
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options are of importance, for example call options to invest, to produce, or to spread the 
option.  
3.4 Put	  Options	  
The put option represents “the right to sell an asset in future, at a price known now, 
whatever its market selling price may be at that time.”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ 
Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.5). 
The put option happens to be profitable as soon as the price of the underlying occurs to be 
lower than the exercise price. The put option contains a boundary, due to the fact that the 
value of the underlying can not be less than zero.  
3.5 European	  Option	  
Originally the terms European and American options described the difference in structure 
of options traded on the stock markets in Europe and in America. Nowadays the 
terminology refers to the structure of the option, irrespective of where the option is traded. 
(Luenberger 1998) 
The European option is an “option which gives the right to invest (or sell out) on only one 
fixed future date.”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.5). 
Hence the European option can only be exercised at maturity. (Trigeorgis 1996) 
3.6 American	  Option	  
In contrast to European options, American options offer the option holder (or the option 
writer) more flexibility, due to the fact that the American option is not bounded to one fix 
expiration date. The American option “gives us the right to invest (or to sell) at any time 
we choose, usually up to some fixed final date.”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ 
Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.5) Therefore the exercise of the option is possible at any point in 
time until the final expiration date. (Luenberger 1998, Trigeorgis 1996) The option holder 
of an American option is more flexible than the holder of an European option and in 
consequence has a higher opportunity of gaining additional value through the option.  
Another form of an option is the perpetual option, an option, which will never expire. The 
occurrence of this type of option is in cases of land use or currency exchanges. (Howell/ 
Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001) 
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3.7 Real	  Options	  
Real option- like instruments existed already in ancient Greece as the story of Thales of 
Milet, conveyed by Aristoteles tells us: The sophist philosopher Thales made a fortune by 
acquiring the right to rent olive presses before harvest. Thales was speculating on a good 
harvest, and as it turned out favourable for him, demand for olive presses increased, he was 
able to charge the high market price for lending the olive presses. (Copeland/ Antikarov 
2001)  
However, Stewart C. Myers formulated the term “real options” in 1977 in his article 
“Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, in analogy to financial options, when realizing 
that growth opportunities can be regarded as call options. As the origin of the real option 
theory lies in financial theory, the real option approach can be seen as an extension to the 
financial option approach. Myers (1977) realized that strategic planning requires finance 
and that the value of a firm is reliant on the future investment strategy of the firm. 
Therefore Myers (1977) perceives the firm to be a combination of two different asset 
types: Firstly, “(…) real assets, which have market values independent of the firm’s 
investment strategy (…)”(Myers 1977, p.163). Secondly, “(…) real options, which are 
opportunities to purchase real assets on possibly favorable terms.”(Myers 1977, p. 163).  
In this sense a real option “(…) is an option to change the ‚real’ physical or intellectual 
activity of a business (...).“(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, 
p.14). For Luenberger (1998) “(…) options are associated with investment opportunities 
that are non financial instruments.”(Luenberger 1998, p.340). Hence the processes 
concerning those investments can be seen as operational options, which are called “real 
options”, in order to emphasize the fact that real activities or commodities are involved. 
(Luenberger 1998)  Examples for real options might be: a new plant, new technology 
creation or implementation in a market, invention of a brand, generating an additional unit 
of output, employ additional staff, building a factory, purchase new equipment, buy new 
land in order to search for raw materials for later extraction, etc.. (Luenberger 1998, 
Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001) 
“A real option exists if we have the right to take a decision at one or more points in the 
future (e.g. to invest or not to invest, or to sell out or not to sell out).” (Howell/ Stark/ 
Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.2) Following this definition of a real 
option, the very basic structure of real options is demonstrated by Ander and Levinthal 
(2004).  
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Figure 1: „The structure of real options“, source: Ander/ Levinthal 2004, p. 75.  
As Figure 1 shows, the first stage in the process represents the decision whether to make an 
investment or not, in detail, whether to acquire an option or not. At stage two, the decision 
whether to exercise the option or not takes place. Ander and Levinthal (2004) argue, that in 
case of the occurrence of favourable news the option will be exercised and in case of 
unfavourable news the option will be abandoned.  
“Real Options (as opposed to financial options) represent a firm’s investments in physical 
or human assets (as opposed to financial assets), which provide the firm the opportunity to 
respond to future events in a contingent fashion (…).“(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.405) The main 
advantage an option lies in gaining new information and reacting in a flexible way, namely 
a learning process. An example of a real option, which creates learning opportunities, is the 
investment in a developing country, with potential future expansion, if the country grows. 
(Kogut/ Kulatilaka 2001) 
“Real options have the potential to make a significant difference in the area of competition 
and strategy.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.19) Following Trigeorgis (1996) real options can create 
sustainable competitive advantages. For instance options to grow by making profitable 
future investments, or the ability to respond to a changing technological, competitive, 
business environment in a flexible and effective way. (Trigeorgis 1996) Therefore a real 
option can affect the value of a firm directly.  
In order to draw an analogy to financial options a comparison of the main variables of 
financial and real options, taken from Howell, Stark, Newton, Paxson, Cavus, Pereira and 
Patel (2001, pp.19-20), is helpful: 
  
2004 Adner and Levinthal 75 
their success. We consider the implications, pos 
itive and negative, of such constraints and com 
pare them to more generic path-dependent ap 
proaches to managing investment under 
uncertainty. 
In the next section we briefly lay out the for 
mal structure of real options. We then examine 
some of the critical assumptions that underlie 
the application of options to firms' investment 
decisions. When uncertainty resolution emerges 
as an outcome of firm action, the sharp temporal 
demarcation made in the options literature be 
tween "Stage 1" and "Stage 2" investments is 
called into question. In such settings, beyond 
learning about a specific initiative, the flexibil 
ity associated with later investment decisions 
often stems from the possibility of discovering a 
wide variety of related opportunities, even in the 
face of unfavorable initial outcomes. We show 
that the greater the extent to which initiatives 
are open ended, the more problematic the appli 
cation of the real options framework is. Flexibil 
ity in search can undermine the flexibility asso 
ciated with abandonment. Abandonment is 
essential for limiting downside risk, a key virtue 
attributed to real option investments. We con 
sider how organizational processes, such as the 
allocation of decision rights that limit the range 
of possible action and the specification of well 
defined temporal boundaries, can extend the 
applicability of real options reasoning but force 
strategic tradeoffs of their own. We conclude by 
considering differences between real options 
approaches and more generic path-dependent 
processes, and we suggest how they might be 
distinguished empirically. 
REAL OPTIONS 
Real options investments are characterized by 
sequential, irreversible investments made un 
der conditions of uncertainty (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994). The framework suggests that purchasing 
a real option on a strategically important oppor 
tunity allows firms to postpone commitment un 
til a substantial portion of the uncertainty about 
the opportunity has been resolved. After making 
an initial investment, management is then to 
turn its attention to other matters and wait for a 
signal as to whether or not it is appropriate to 
harvest or cultivate the initial investment. 
Consider the events that transpire prior to the 
exercise of financial options, on which the real 
options model is based (Figure 1). First, an in 
vestor purchases an option (Stage 1). Then, dur 
ing the course of the holding period, the value of 
the option changes in response to external 
events. Throughout the holding period, the fi 
nancial markets provide a clear signal as to the 
current value of the option. Finally, events tran 
spire so that the investor chooses to exercise the 
option, or, alternatively, the expiration date 
specified in the option contract is reached and 
the option expires (Stage 2). Investments with 
this structure are optionlike in that Stage 2 in 
vestments are not a necessary consequence of 
FIGURE 1 
The Structure of Real Options 
Invest 
in option 
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Favorable news: 
exercise option 
through follow-on^ 
investment 
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Unfavorable news: 
abandon option 
Do not invest 
- Net profits 
' Loss of initial invest investment 
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Financial Options Real Options 
Stock Price Net present value (NPV) of the 
potential investment, in case of making 
the investment today. 
Underlying asset = unit of stock Underlying asset = potential physical 
or intellectual investment  
Exercise Price = Fixed price at which 
we can buy (call) or sell (put) a unit of 
stock. 
Exercise Price = Fixed price at which 
we can make a business investment, or 
sell it up. 
Expiry Date = Last date of exercise 
(American) or only date of exercise 
(European).  
Expiry Date = Last day for possible 
investment (American), or only day for 
possible investment (European). 
Table 1: Comparison of the main variables of financial and real options, see Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ 
Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, pp.19-20. 
Further in financial options the option holder has the right to buy (call) or sell (put), 
whereas in real options the option holder has the opportunity to invest (call) or disinvest, 
sell up, (put) the option. This right of the option holder is regulated in financial options, 
concerning the continuity of this right, by having American-, European-, or perpetual 
styled options. In comparison to real options the continuity of the right of the option holder 
may vary among those three possibilities or takes a combination of this three types. 
(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001)  
As the analogy to financial options is not perfectly possible, which is demonstrated above 
in Table 1, problems occur in terms of options valuation (see Chapter 3.7.3.3, “Problems in 
Options Valuation”).  
However, “The key difference between a financial and a real option is that a decision about 
a financial option cannot change the value of the firm itself, while a wrong decision about 
a real option will change the firm’s resources and its value.”(Howell/ Stark/ Newton/ 
Paxson/ Cavus/ Pereira/ Patel 2001, p.7).  
Therefore real options analysis is essential, as it alleviates to determine, when or if a firm 
should take one of the possible decisions, and how much money should be spend on 
purchasing an economic chance.  
The question if the use of the real option approach is suitable for any investment is of 
importance. Ander and Levinthal (2004) argued for instance that a sequential stream of 
investment does not necessarily represent a real option.  
Baecker and Hommel (2004) suggest three characteristics, to, in general, identify real 
investment projects as option rights: 
“(1) payoffs are subject to some form of (market) risk (uncertainty),  
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(2) management possesses certain degree of freedom in allocating corporate funds or assets 
(flexibility), and, finally,  
(3) using these degrees of freedom will lead to some form of sunk costs 
(irreversibility).”(Baecker/ Hommel 2004, p.3)  
Schulmerich (2005) identifies as well criteria, when real options approach is sensible to 
apply: 
In case of an investment decision, which is contingent. In case of high uncertainty, when 
gaining more information is advantageous. Further, when the value seems to lie in future 
growth options rather, than in current cash flow possibilities. At the time when the level of 
uncertainty creates flexibility, and, finally, when project updates are possible and strategy 
adaptations during the project exist. (Schulmerich 2005)  
 
“Carrying over this insight from financial options to real options is what makes real 
options theory particularly appealing: it deals with one of firms’ most important challenges 
by linking current strategic decisions with uncertainty about future outcomes.”(Cuypers/ 
Martin 2010, p. 50) 
Hence the real options approach “(…) encourages experimentation and the proactive 
exploration of uncertainty.”(Bowman/ Moskowitz 2001, p.777).  
3.7.1 Assumptions	  of	  the	  Real	  Options	  Approach	  
Real options theory is based upon several assumptions, most of them sourcing in financial 
option theory. As the assumptions concerning options valuation are discussed later in 
Chapter 3.7.3.2, “Assumptions of Real Options Valuation”, this sections mentions only 
some basic principles underlying real options theory.  
According to Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) real options analysis contains two main 
assumptions:” 
a.) the firm has a monopoly over an investment opportunity,  
b.) the product market is perfectly competitive”(Kulatilaka/ Perotti 1998, p.1021). 
 
Further one of the main principles of real options theory, is the effect of uncertainty (see 
Chapter 5.4.1, “Uncertainty”). “In real options theory, one of the main predictions is that 
higher levels of uncertainty will increase option value, which will in turn increase the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a real options investment.”(Cuypers/ Martin 2010, p.62) 
The rise in value results not from the uncertainty per se, but from the emerging flexibility 
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in the managerial decision making process. Hence, „The real options approach to 
valuation, or the modern theory of investment under uncertainty, is based on a simple but 
nevertheless profound insight: flexibility creates value.“(Baecker/ Hommel 2004, p.2). 
This statement characterizes one of the most basic assumptions underlying real options 
theory: the creation of value via flexibility. Moreover the value- driving factors are 
assumed to follow an unforeseeable random walk (see Chapter 3.2.9, “Random Walk”).  
3.7.2 Types	  of	  Real	  Options	  
“A real option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action (e.g., deferring, 
expanding, contracting, or abandoning) at a predetermined cost called the exercise price, 
for a predetermined period of time- the life of the option.”(Copeland/ Antikarov 2001, p.5) 
Following this statement the decision maker has several possibilities how to act and react 
confronted with an uncertain environment. Hence a lot of different types of options exist. 
In research (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006, Trigeorgis 1996, Bowman/ Hurry 1993) the 
attempt of categorizing the varying options has been made. In this section some of the 
most relevant types of options are going to be discussed. 
According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) the four most important real option types 
are: 
1. The option to make follow- on investments:  
The basic idea behind the option to make follow- on investments is the cognition, 
that an investment today may create future opportunities. This type of option 
generates strategic value, even in situations, when projects are pursued with a 
negative net present value (NPV) or negative cash flows. Due to the fact that 
certain projects lead to call options on follow- on projects, strategic value is added 
to the project, beside the value of immediate cash flows. A company might be 
aware of the option to make follow- on investments, when for instance investing in 
a project in a new technology market in order to ensure their presence in the 
market, to gain from future opportunities or follow- on projects.  
2. The option to wait (and learn) before investing:  
The option to wait, or the option to defer investment can be seen as a call option on 
the investment. In some circumstances the call option on the investment may be 
more valuable than the immediate commitment to invest. Therefore it seems to be 
more advantageous to defer a positive NPV project, especially under high 
uncertainty and when immediate cash flows of the project are low. Consequently 
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the option to wait offers the decision makers the opportunity to learn and gain more 
information confronted with an uncertain environment. Managers have the 
possibility to keep options open and act more flexible. Therefore Guthrie (2009) 
emphasizes the importance of learning options in situations concerning for instance 
market research, construction cost uncertainty, research and development (R&D), 
and resource extraction. 
3. The option to abandon:  
The decision to abandon a project might be driven by several factors. The 
profitability of the project, the limited flexibility of the project in respect to future 
changes, the strategic orientation of the company, etc. can lead to the abandonment 
of a project. The option to abandon creates value for the company, due to the fact 
that it is equivalent to owning a put option. The assets, which are not used for the 
abandoned project anymore are shifted to other more valuable projects or sold. 
Hence the value of the project’s assets represents the exercise price of the option to 
abandon. The option to abandon therefore acts as an insurance against the failure of 
a project.  
4. The option to vary the firm’s output or its production methods:  
The option to vary the firm’s output or its production methods offers the firm the 
advantage of obtaining a higher level of flexibility. The assets of a project are 
deployed in a flexible way. The company has the possibility to modify the inputs or 
the outputs in the production process. For instance the firm builds the infrastructure 
or production facilities in order to be able to exchange the assets to get cheaper 
production processes or to create a range of valuable outputs. One prominent 
example for the option of switching the inputs of a production process is the one of 
an electric utility using an oil- fired plant, which can be converted into a gas- fired 
one. As circumstances are changing, such as oil price is rising while gas price is 
decreasing at the same time, the option to decide which raw material to use 
becomes particularly valuable for the electric utility. An example for the flexible 
exchange of outputs is a textile company, which is able to produce different 
products or designs of clothing through having a highly developed computer- 
controlled knitting machine. The possible exchange of assets creates the value of 
the option to vary the firm’s output or its production methods. 
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Further, Trigeorgis (1996) presents a broader set of options naming four more option 
categorizations than Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006):  
1. The option to defer investment: 
As above-mentioned, the option to defer, also the option to wait, is valuable to the 
firm, due to the fact that waiting enables the resolution of uncertainty through 
gaining more information and through learning. Trigeorgis (1996) perceives this 
type of option as an American call option and states the option to be especially 
valuable in case of long investment horizons and high uncertainty. As examples for 
those conditions Trigeorgis (1996) mentions resource extraction industries, real 
estate development, paper products, and farming.  
Leiblein (2003) also enhances the advantages of the option to defer investment, 
recognizing that premature commitment may lead to considerable risks. Further 
“Real option theory recognizes the expected value associated with this latter 
flexibility and indicates that, under uncertainty, it may be optimal to utilize market 
like mechanisms that provide greater flexibility.”(Leiblein 2003, p.949). Following 
this logic the value of the option to wait for more information increases with a 
higher level of uncertainty and when the current cash flows, lost because of 
postponing investment, happen to be relatively low. (Leiblein 2003) 
2. The option to default during staged construction (Time-to-build option): 
The option to default during staged construction accounts for the fact that a lot of 
investments in reality do not only need a single expenditure. As costs of investment 
can be staged over time, the option to choose at any stage whether to proceed 
investment or not, appears to be valuable. For instance the exploration of land in 
order to find raw materials can be seen as one stage of investment. After the 
exploration the decision to proceed, and to start mine working, might be influenced 
by the outcome of exploration work or the change in prices for the raw materials. If 
the outcome of the stage, or additional information turns out to be unfavourable for 
the project, the option to default at any stage is expedient. Therefore each stage can 
be seen as an option on future options and might be regarded in valuation like 
compound options. Trigeorgis (1996) states that in research and development 
(R&D) industries, in venture- capital financing, as well as in capital- intense, highly 
uncertain and long- development industries, this option is of particular importance.  
3. The option to expand: 
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The option to expand provides the firm with the possibility to react to 
circumstances, which turn out to be more favourable than expected and represents a 
call option on future investments. Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) entitle this 
option as the option to make follow- on investments. Trigeorgis (1996) emphasizes 
the linkage between the option to expand and growth options when he states that, 
“The option to expand may also be of strategic importance, especially if it enables 
the firm to capitalize on future growth opportunities.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.11). 
4. The option to contract: 
In case conditions turn out to be less favourable than expected for a project or 
investment the management of the firm can decide to reduce operations. The 
potential cost savings act therefore like the exercise price of the put option. 
Particularly the option to contract seems to be important when choosing between 
different operations (plants, technologies, etc.) in uncertain markets.  
5. The option to shutdown and restart operations: 
Another possibility, besides reducing operations, when the state of nature happens 
to be unfavourable for a certain period of time, is the option to shutdown and restart 
operations. For example a production facility can be closed temporarily until the 
market price of the product rises again. The firm has the opportunity to wait and to 
restart operations when conditions improve. 
6. The option to abandon for salvage value: 
As above-mentioned (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) the option to abandon provides 
the management with the possibility to close projects or investments, while 
benefitting from the salvage value. Trigeorgis (1996) defines the option to abandon 
for salvage value as an American put option on the investment’s present value.   
7. The option to switch use: 
The incorporation of flexibility, by creating alternative choices regarding inputs as 
well as outputs of a production process adds value to the firm. According to 
Trigeorgis (1996) this process flexibility might be generated via technology, via the 
switching among several different suppliers, subcontracting policies, or 
geographical diversification of investments. Further product flexibility also 
increases a project’s value, due to the switching among different outputs, for 
instance creating an alternative product with the existing assets. 
In this context Leiblein (2003) states the real option argument that “(…) certain 
resources create economic value by providing the ability to flexibly switch use of 
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assets.”(Leiblein 2003, p.950). For example, Reuer and Tong (2007) assume for 
multinational companies (MNC) the existence of a portfolio of switching options. 
In this respect, Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) investigate the operating flexibility of 
dislocating production from one manufacturing plant to another foreign plant.  
8. Corporate growth options: 
Growth options are of particular strategic importance for a firm as they generate the 
right but not the obligation to profit from future opportunities. Following 
Trigeorgis (1996) the existence of growth options increases in multinational 
operations, strategic acquisitions, R&D, high technology, and in industries with 
multiple product applications or generations. For example, the investment in the 
first generation of a high technology product might create the option of future 
growth opportunities. Therefore the value of an option to grow is not only 
determined by its expected cash flows but also by the following future possibilities 
emerging from this first project. 
Leiblein (2003) emphasizes the specific value of growth options in high 
technological industries, which Leiblein (2003) presumes to be characterized by the 
agglomeration of inter- generational knowledge spillovers and by the existence of 
weak appropriability regimes. “In these contexts, it will often be desirable to 
internalize activities associated with early generations of a product or technology in 
order to maintain a claim on the opportunity to participate in subsequent 
generations of that product or technology.”(Leiblein 2003, p.949) Therefore the 
option to grow enables the firm to develop or expand a related product in the 
future. (Leiblein 2003) 
 
Bowman and Hurry (1993) mentioned in their article “Strategy through the Option Lens: 
An Integrated View of Resource Investments and the Incremental-Choice Process” another 
term for options characterization, the shadow option (see Figure 2). The resources of an 
organization (e.g., its capabilities and assets) represent, from the option theory perspective, 
a bundle of options for future strategic choice. In order to gain advantage of the 
opportunities for strategic choice, it is necessary that decision makers are able to recognize 
these options. Therefore the existence of so called ‘shadow options’ can be assumed. 
Those shadow options might be hidden in the bundle of options and are waiting for 
discovery. For the recognition of such shadow options managers have to use retrospective 
sense making. (Bowman/ Hurry 1993) 
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Figure 2: „The option chain“, source: Bowman/ Hurry 1993, p. 764.  
Further Bowman and Hurry (1993) separate options into two basic categories: 
1. Incremental Options: which represent simple call and put options. 
2. Flexibility Options: which represent “choices to switch investment 
streams”(Bowman/ Hurry 1993, p.763). For instance the investment of an 
automobile producing firm in alternative technologies, such as electric- driven 
automobiles. 
Therefore options create the mechanism of choice, which underlies strategy.  
 
Another classification of options is presented by McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004). 
McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004) state that four types of options can be identified:” 
1. as a component of total firm value, 
2. as specific projects, 
3. as choices, and 
4. as a heuristic for strategic investment.”(McGrath/ Ferrier/ Mendelow 2004, p.86). 
764 Academy of Management Review October 
gains the option to switch product strategies over time. Options thus form 
the choice mechanism that underlies strategy (see Figure 1). 
The Activation of Options 
Within the option chain, a fixed sequence of actions is involved in the 
activation (i.e., the recognition and striking) of options. Upon recognition 
of a shadow option, managers are motivated to secure preferential access 
(i.e., to strengthen the linkage to the opportunity), to wait and see if the 
opportunity materializes, and to develop the skills necessary to exploit it 
fully. In other words, they are motivated to convert the shadow option into 
a real option. Given uncertainty, this move usually involves making a 
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In reality the characterization of real options is far more complex. It turns out that the 
occurrence of just one option happens to be the exceptional case. Instead options very 
often accumulate and compound options emerge. Therefore a combination of two or more 
of the above-mentioned options can occur. Especially in real options valuation compound 
options lead to highly complex frameworks. Hence it is important to keep in mind, that 
although the above-mentioned characterizations of options help to understand the process 
of integrating real options view into management decisions, the sharp assignment of those 
option categories remains rather theoretical. On the one hand the combination of options 
increases complexity of analysis, on the other hand compound options offer higher 
operating flexibility and therefore add more value to the firm. Schulmerich (2005) also 
emphasizes the fact that in reality the most common type of options are multiple 
interacting options.  
3.7.3 Real	  Options	  Valuation	  
The valuation of real options represents one of the most problematic analysis processes in 
strategic management. As real options approach emerged originally from financial option 
theory, the real options approach can be perceived as an extension to financial option 
theory.  
Since the valuation of options has a long tradition in financial budgeting several theoretical 
mathematical frameworks exist to calculate the value of an option.  
The real option approach represents a challenge to traditional valuation techniques, such as 
the common technique of discounted cash flow. However the fundamental financial 
techniques and valuation methods will be applied to real option analysis in order to provide 
a basis for strategic decision-making. 
 
The beginning of conceptual real options approaches can be determined with Myers’s in 
1977, who was “(…) thinking of discretionary investment opportunities as ‘growth 
options’ (…)”(Trigeorgis 1996, p. 15 ; see Myers 1977). The origins of quantitative real 
options analysis were made by research (Black, Scholes and Merton) in order to price 
financial options.  
In the early 1970’s Myron C. Scholes and Fisher Black invented an important instrument 
of option’s valuation, the Black- Scholes formula. Robert C. Merton extended the model 
introduced by Scholes and Black. (Baecker/ Hommel 2004, Schulmerich 2005) In 1997 
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Myron C. Scholes and Robert C. Merton won the Nobel Price in Economic Sciences for 
their contributions to the methods for valuing derivatives.  
Another important step in advancing the real options valuation has been taken by “(…) the 
recognition that an option can be replicated (…) from an equivalent portfolio of traded 
securities.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p. 16). This knowledge is important since risk- neutral 
valuation was possible. Consequently the present value discounting of predicted future 
cash flows at a risk-free interest rate was feasible. Trigeorgis (1996) depicts the problem 
that in real options valuation one approach was to analyse the different real options in 
isolation. However valuing only one type of option at a time may not represent the real –
life situation, due to the fact that projects in reality are characterized rather by multiple real 
options with high likely interdependencies. In order to face the complexity emerging from 
multiple real options also game theoretic approaches were considered. Still, various 
numerical analysis techniques, which profit from the possibility of the risk free valuation, 
alleviate the valuation of real options. (Trigeorgis 1996) 
Trigeorgis (1996) defines two sorts of numerical techniques for option valuation in 
general: 
1. Techniques “(…) that approximate the underlying stochastic processes directly, and 
are generally more intuitive (…)”(Trigeorgis 1996, p. 21). This group of valuation 
techniques embodies the Monte Carlo Simulation and differing lattice approaches. 
(Trigeorgis 1996) 
2. Techniques “(…) that approximate the resulting partial differential 
equations.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.21). According to Trigeorgis (1996) those 
techniques are advantageous in order to explain dividend- like effects, option 
interactions and complex option constructs. As examples for such techniques 
Trigeorgis (1996) lists numerical integration, implicit or explicit finite-difference 
schemes, and analytic approximations.   
For a more detailed summary of the development of real options valuation techniques since 
the early 1970’s, see Trigeorgis (1996). 
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Copeland and Antikarov (2001) introduce a four- step process for valuing real options. (see 
Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3: „Four- step process for valuing real options“, source: Copeland/ Antikarov 2001, p.220.  
In the first step the focus is put on a standard net present value analysis. The project’s 
present value is calculated by a discounted cash flow valuation model. In the second step 
an event tree is developed, by incorporating a set of combined uncertainties. The volatility 
of the project therefore depends on the range of defined uncertainties. The event tree 
displays the model of uncertainties, which influence the value of the underlying asset over 
time. The third step of the process refers to the transformation of the event tree into a 
decision tree via integrating the possible decisions of managers. The decision tree gives an 
idea of the potential gains of optimal decisions. In the final step of the process of 
estimating the value of an option the payoffs in the decision tree are analysed. Therefore 
the method of replicating portfolios or risk- neutral probabilities is utilized. It is of 
importance to notice the fact that Copeland and Antikarov (2001) assume that the complex 
set of uncertainties can be simplified to only one uncertainty and that price fluctuation 
follows a normal random walk. (Copeland/ Antikarov 2001) 
3.7.3.1 Option	  Value	  
The first explicit approach, in order to calculate the value of an option, dates back to 1900, 
when the French mathematician Bachelier addressed to the problem of finding a 
calculation formula for option value on the financial market. (Bachelier 1900, Figlewski 
1990)  
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For financial options the value of the option in general is defined as the option premium. 
“An option’s premium can be broken down into two parts: intrinsic value (sometimes 
called parity value), and time value (sometimes called premium over parity).”(Dubofsky 
1992, p.14) The intrinsic value describes the value of the option, if exercise of the option 
takes places immediate. The time value represents the positive probability of a positive 
change of the underlying price. (Maisel 2009) The intrinsic value of an option at or out of 
the money equals zero. As the option happens to be in the money, the intrinsic value equals 
the amount the option happens to be in the money. In case a call option is at or out of the 
money, the option only has time value. (Dubofsky 1992) “The longer the time to 
expiration, the greater a call’s time value, all else equal.”(Dubofsky 1992, p.15) The time 
value of an option decreases over time resulting in having at expiration only the intrinsic 
value left. (Figlewski/ Silber 1990)  
The time value of an option sources in two components: the leverage value and the value 
of the option feature. The leverage value describes the fact that the more time to expiration 
is left, the better is the possibility of earning interest with the, not immediately paid, 
exercise price. As the intrinsic value and the leverage value together form the value of a 
forward contract, the third value component is the value of not being obliged to exercise 
the option. (Figlewski/ Silber 1990) 
Hence for a call option, the  𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑐  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒,  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒. 
 
In the same mode of thought, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) differentiate, as well, two 
factors, which describe the value of a real investment: the strategic value and the 
alternative value of not investing. The latter represents a form of flexibility, which is added 
to traditional valuation methods. (Kulatilaka/ Perotti 1998) 
For McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004) the two sufficient conditions for the creation 
of option value are “(…) future choices and potential for proprietary access to 
outcomes.”(McGrath/ Ferrier/ Mendelow 2004, p.86).  
According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) the value of a call option can be influenced 
by five variables:  
1. The higher the price of an underlying asset, the more valuable an option to acquire 
it. 
2. The lower the exercise price, the more valuable the option. 
 23 
3. No payment of the exercise price before expiration date leads to a delay, which 
turns out to be most valuable when the interest rate is high. 
4. The option turns out to be valueless if the exercise price exceeds the stock price at 
expiration date. In contrast, as soon as the stock price exceeds the exercise price, 
the option holder gains additional value. Accordingly, the value of the call option 
rises with the volatility of the stock price. 
5. Long-term options are more valuable than short-term options. A greater period of 
time until expiration of the option implies a higher possibility of a rise in stock 
price. 
In dependence on point 5, Figure 4 shows the value of a call option with different times to 
expiration. 
 
Figure 4: Option price curve with various times to expiration, Luenberger (1998), p.322. 
S represents a given stock price, K describes the strike price and C (𝐶 = max  (0, 𝑆 − 𝐾)) 
is the value of the call option at expiration. (Luenberger 1998) As demonstrated in Figure 4 
the value of a call option rises with a longer the time to expiration. The value of an option 
hold for six months is bigger than the value of an option with three months duration.  
In the following, some techniques in order to calculate the value of options are presented. 
 
Discounted Cash Flow 
In order to calculate the value of investment opportunities one prominent instrument used 
is the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF). 
As real options are rarely traded, we value the option as if it could be traded. Therefore the 
present value of the underlying asset serves as a starting point for analysis. The calculation 
of the present value of the underlying asset is usually conducted by discounted cash flow. 
(Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) 
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The standard procedure to value an asset follows two steps. First step is to derive the 
expected cash flows and the second step is to discount the cash flows at the opportunity 
cost of capital. (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) Hence a calculation about a future 
investment’s attractiveness is possible for financial options.  
 
Net Present Value 
The net present value (NPV) is an instrument used in capital budgeting in order to estimate 
the earning power of an investment or a project. The method of net present value offers a 
relatively easy way to evaluate the present value of future monetary flows of an 
investment.  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶!1+ 𝑟 ! − 𝐼!!!!  
The formula for the NPV is taken from Trigeorgis (1996):”  
• r is the (risk-free) opportunity cost of capital, 
• 𝐶! is the (certain) net cash flow in year t, 
• I is (single initial) investment outlay, and  
• T is the number of years of the project’s life.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p. 31.). 
 
Net present value analysis works with future incoming cash flows. In detail, the net present 
value regards inflation and returns in the analysis, while comparing the value of a dollar 
today to the value of the same dollar in the future. If the NPV happens to be negative, the 
project or in investment should be refused, whereas if the NPV is positive the investment 
or project should be conducted. However the NPV analysis faces several boundaries, due 
to the missing of considerations of different forms of flexibility. For instance the lack of 
the possibility, that future decision could change cash flows in a positive direction. Hence 
NPV analysis is said to settle too little value to an investment or project, due to its 
underlying assumption that an investment has to be done now or never. (Trigeorgis 1996, 
Schulmerich 2005, Maisel 2009, Woschnagg 2004) 
 
Binominal Method 
The calculation of the value of an option by using the binominal method is essentially the 
same process when solving decision trees. However it is necessary to discount within those 
decision trees and therefore option pricing theory is required. (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) 
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The binominal method assumes that the stock price for the option can proceed in two 
directions, either rise or fall. This change in stock price will happen with a certain 
probability. As the stock price of the asset is able to change at any given point in time, the 
duration of the option can be split into several time intervals. Every time the stock price 
changes, it is assumed that it could change in two different directions with given 
probabilities.  
“The general binominal method adds realism by dividing the option’ life into a number of 
subperiods in each of which the stock price can make one of two possible 
moves.”(Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006, p.585) For valuing the option it is suggested to 
analyse such a binominal “tree” by working backwards from the expiration date to the 
present. (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006) 
 
The Black- Scholes- Formula 
One major problem in creating an options valuation model is that it seems to be based 
upon two factors, which are not directly observable: the price of an option follows a certain 
not predictable probability distribution and to find an appropriate risk- adjusted interest 
rate in order to discount the future probable payoffs of the option. In response to this 
problem Fischer Black and Myron Scholes invented the Black- Scholes formula. 
(Figlewski 1990) 
Myron S. Scholes and Fischer Black invented the Black- Scholes Model in the early 
1970’s. In 1973 Black and Scholes published their article “The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities“ and derived the Black- Scholes formula for valuing options. Robert 
C. Merton extended the Black- Scholes formula with his no-arbitrage argument. 
(Schulmerich 2005)  
According to Copeland and Antikarov (2001) the formula uses several assumptions: Firstly 
the formula is derived for a European call option. Secondly a single source of uncertainty, 
that remains fix over time, is presumed. Thirdly the coping with compound state of affairs 
is not intended. Fourthly the payment of dividends on the underlying asset is not regarded 
and fifthly a constant exercise price is assumed. (Copeland/ Antikarov 2001) 
The Black- Scholes formula “(…) calculates the option’s value when the stock price is 
constantly changing and takes on a continuum of possible future values.” (Brealey/ Myers/ 
Allen 2006, p.585) The continuous division of the option’s life into more and more 
subperiods provides a continuum of stock price changes at maturity, which can be 
described by a lognormal distribution. (Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006)  
 26 
One advantage of the Black- Scholes formula is that it needs only five elements of input to 
calculate the value of a European call option: “the current value of the underlying asset, the 
cost of investment, the risk-free rate of return, the time to expiration of the option, and the 
volatility of the underlying asset.”(Amram/ Kulatilaka 1999, p.28).  
Based on financial option theory, and derived from Black- Scholes formula, “(…) the 
value of a call option is higher (1) the higher the value of the underlying asset (e.g., the 
stock), (…) (2) the longer the time to expiration, (…) (3) the lower the exercise price, (…) 
(4) the higher the variance of asset returns (…) and (5) the higher the riskless interest rate 
(...)” (Trigeorgis 1996, p.91). 
Although Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) state that “The Black-Scholes formula often 
suffices to value expansion options.”(Brealey/ Myers/ Allen 2006, p.616), Black and 
Scholes (1973) are quite aware of the limitations of their formula when dealing with more 
complex options. In this context Black and Scholes (1973) are mentioning that, “the 
formula cannot be used, even as an approximation, to give the value of an option on an 
option.“(Black/ Scholes 1973, p.652). 
In case of using the traditional financial option valuing techniques one should always keep 
in mind that they represent only an approximation to the very complex and hard to measure 
real- life conditions. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) emphasize this complexity when stating, 
“(…), the value of a project depends on future prices of outputs and inputs, interest rates, 
etc.”(Dixit/ Pindyck 1994, p.175). Therefore the valuation of real options via financial 
option techniques leads to a certain degree of fuzziness. Hence it is important to consider 
the main assumptions used in standard options valuation.  
3.7.3.2 Assumptions	  of	  Real	  Options	  Valuation	  	  
The standard underlying assumptions of real options valuation according to Trigeorgis 
(1996) are: 
1. Continuous trading is feasible, due to the presumptions that “(…) there are no 
transaction costs or (differential) taxes; (…) no restrictions on short sales (…), and 
full use of proceeds is allowed; (…) all shares of all securities are infinitely 
divisible; and (…) borrowing and lending (at the same rate) are 
unrestricted.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.83). Hence frictionless markets are assumed. 
2. Constant (or apparent) risk- free (short term) interest rate over the duration of the 
option. 
3. No dividend payments on the underlying asset over the duration of the option. 
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4. The price of the underlying follows “(…) a stochastic diffusion Wiener process 
(…)”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.83). (For an explanation of the Wiener process, also called 
Brownian motion, see Dixit/ Pindyck 1994)  
 
Further Dubofsky (1992) mentions also, accordingly to the first assumption of Trigeorgis 
(1996), the important idea, which underlies the Black-Scholes formula: “Markets are 
always open and trading is continuous.”(Dubofsky 1992, p.178).  
Due to the fact that real options valuation techniques underlie certain (above- mentioned) 
assumptions, they represent simplifications of a highly complex reality. As Bachelier 
(1900) already realised in respect to calculation and valuation methods on the stock market 
in 1900: “(…) la dynamique de la Bourse ne sera jamais une science exacte.”(Bachelier 
1900, p.21). 
3.7.3.3 Problems	  in	  Options	  Valuation	  
As the nature of options, financial options as well as real options is dynamic, several 
problems occur, when option valuation is conducted.  
Financial valuation methods, such as DCF, do not include the possibility of managers 
making decisions and taking an advantage of emerging opportunities while the duration of 
a project. (Schulmerich 2005) The strategic decision-making and the flexible reaction to 
changing circumstances of managers can contribute additional value to the project.  
Moreover the DCF model does not include the implicit value of flexibility. (Bowman 
/Moskowitz 2001) 
Therefore the traditional financial valuation methods, like DCF and NPV analysis are not 
sufficient for the valuation of a real option for several reasons. The assumptions underlying 
the DCF and the NPV analysis do not apply exactly to the nature of real option approach. 
Firstly the DCF and the NPV approach assume the investment to have the character of a 
‘now or never’, respectively ‘all or nothing’ decision. Following this logic the project is 
perceived to be held passively. Secondly, the traditional valuation methods are based on 
the idea of a single expected cash flow, which is compiled by the future cash flows and 
their probabilities. Beside the problematic of accurate cash flow selection, the 
determination of the adequate discount rate represents a critical issue. Further the usage of 
a constant risk- adjusted interest rate, when discounting the cash flows, postulates that risk 
is perceived to be constant for the lifetime of the project. (Dixit/ Pindyck 1994, Maisel 
2009) In fact “(…) there is no single, constant discount rate for options because the risk of 
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the option changes as time and the price of the underlying asset change.”(Brealey/ Myers/ 
Allen 2006, p.575). 
In practice the decisions, which are made during a project, are influencing the project’s 
cash flow structure and the discount factor. (Schulmerich 2005) Therefore the traditional 
approaches of capital budgeting do not incorporate the additional value for a project, 
gained by flexible decision- making. Baecker and Hommel (2004) state that, the 
fundamental differences between real options and financial options lead to several 
problems in options valuation. For instance, the complexity increases as options are 
interacting or as there exist compound options, technical risks in regard to real options may 
occur, the problem of bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the consideration of 
competitive effects, such as a first mover advantage, etc.. (Baecker/ Hommel 2004) 
Summarizing, Baecker and Hommel (2004) mention that, “practitioners face a multitude of 
methodological challenges not encountered when using traditional valuation 
techniques.”(Baecker/ Hommel 2004, p.5). 
Further Dixit and Pindyck (1994) realised that, what they call “the orthodox theory of 
investment”(Dixit/ Pindyck 1994, p.4) does not include the essential “(…) qualitative and 
quantitative implications of the interaction between irreversibility, uncertainty and the 
choice of timing.”(Dixit/ Pindyck 1994, p.4).  
 
However, considering questions of real options valuation represents an essential tool in 
supporting managerial decisions. The valuation of projects from a real option perspective 
might differ substantially from traditional analysis (DCF, NPV, etc.), due to the awareness 
that real options can be useful instruments in order to minimize downside risk of 
investment, while maximizing upside opportunities. Consequently, managerial decisions of 
entry mode choice and the use of different investment strategies are influenced by the real 
options approach. The option “(…) is valuable because it gives managerial discretion to 
respond profitably to the realization of uncertain events.”(Kogut/ Kulatilaka 1994, p.125). 
3.7.4 Real	  Options	  and	  Strategic	  Investment	  
The real options approach offers new perspectives in order to solve problems of strategic 
investment decisions.  
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) demonstrated the application of optimal investment rules, 
created originally in financial options theory in order to price options. (Dixit/ Pindyck 
1994) 
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According to Leiblein (2003) the application of the real options approach to the field of 
strategic investment relies on two main principles. The first insight concerns the existence 
of “(…) opportunity costs associated with irreversible investment under 
uncertainty.”(Leiblein 2003, p.948). Consequently, one of the basic principles of real 
options theory emerges: “(…) the ability to defer committing resources under uncertainty 
is valuable (…)”(Leiblein 2003, p.948). The second insight of real options theory, which 
influences strategic investment decisions, is the idea that growth options exist. Those 
growth options result form the fact that “(…) many investments create valuable follow- on 
investment opportunities (…)”(Leiblein 2003, p.948). Following the real options logic, 
these two main principles enhance managers to act flexibly and proactively, when 
confronted with uncertainty. The flexibility gained offers the possibility to benefit from 
future opportunities, through actively deciding to undertake upfront investments and to 
react in respect to new information in a flexible fashion. Therefore the managerial 
flexibility can be capitalized as soon as the firm gets new information (e.g., about market 
demand, competitive conditions, the success of new technologies, the operability of new 
processes, etc.). (Leiblein 2003)  
 
Assumptions for the Real Options Approach in Strategic Investment 
 
Two main assumptions underlie the applicability of real options approach to the field of 
strategic investment. Firstly, managers need to be capable of writing “(…) contracts that 
provide implicit or explicit claims on future, follow-on opportunities.”(Leiblein 2003, 
p.948). In order to generate a claim on future opportunities, it is necessary for managers to 
anticipate ex ante the possibility of differences in options valuation ex post. (Chi/ McGuire 
1996)  
The second assumption creates difficulties in terms of measurability. It refers to the idea 
that, “(…) it is possible to specify a distribution of expected returns associated with an 
investment.“(Leiblein 2003, p.948) a priori. The difficulty with this presumption emerges 
form the underlying definition of uncertainty. As Leiblein (2003) notes, the assumption of 
being able to estimate the expected value of an option, is rather based on the Knightian 
concept of risk (Knight 1921), which is measurable due to statistical probability 
distributions. 
Further two main implications are linked to those two assumptions. Firstly, the firm value 
is build up of two components: “(…) the present value of existing assets in place and the 
present value derived from the creation of discretional future opportunities (...)“(Leiblein 
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2003, p.948). Besides, the structure of firm’s value it is believed that the value of the two 
named component parts is estimable, which in reality turn out to be problematic. Secondly, 
managers with deeper insight and decision- making authority over uncertain projects will 
tend to underestimate the value of a project, when utilizing traditional valuation 
techniques. The value gained by the ability to update flexibly an investment strategy is not 
accounted for in traditional theories of investment or governance. (Leiblein 2003) 
As a consequence of those considerations, „(...) firms may choose governance structures in 
a dynamic fashion in anticipation of future opportunities.“(Leiblein 2003, p.949)  
Further the demand for managers to react in a more flexible fashion increases: “Greater 
uncertainty creates the need for greater flexibility.”(Amram/ Kulatilaka 1999, p.27). 
 
In the next section, the focus is driven to the application of real options theory on problems 
of choosing a governance mode. Specifically, attention will be drawn to the real options 
approach in alliances, as subsequent, considerations for the real options approach in regard 
to real option clauses in franchising contracts are going to be presented. 
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4. Real	  Options	  in	  Alliances	  
In this chapter the focus will be driven to two main directions of real options approach in 
alliances. Firstly, the attention is drawn to the investigation of entry modes acting as real 
options. Secondly, certain contractual elements enabling the right to hold real options in 
alliances are matter of analysis.  
Up to now, real options approach has been applied by literature to several fields of 
research. While Trigeorgis (1996), Folta (1998) focused on research and development 
(R&D) decision- making and investment, Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) analysed the 
evolution of organizational capabilities as real options. Further entry decisions were 
considered with the real options approach, for instance Folta and Miller 2002a. Moreover 
researchers, like Kogut (1991), Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), and Kulatilaka and Perotti 
(1998), dealt with the application of real options theory to expansion decisions.  
Furthermore Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) highlight the fact that real 
options theory represents a crucial instrument in order to explain various managerial 
decisions. The real options approach might be considered to be useful in fields such as, 
research and development (R&D) and information technology investments, technology 
licensing, technological joint ventures and industry entry decisions. (Estrada/ De la Fuente/ 
Martín-Cruz 2010)  
4.1 Entry	  Mode	  as	  a	  Real	  Option	  
Among the first applications of real options theory to strategic managerial decision- 
making, is the idea that entry modes themselves could be regarded as real options. In this 
sense, studies (Kogut 1991, Chi/ McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, Estrada/ 
De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010, Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009) are based upon the concept, 
that foreign market entry modes, such as joint ventures or licensing, can be perceived as 
being real options. A joint venture, for instance, which is followed by an acquisition by 
one of the partners, can therefore represent an option to defer investment, to learn and to 
grow.  
In the following, the application of real options approach to joint ventures and licensing is 
presented.  
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4.1.1 Joint	  ventures	  
The first study, which draws attention to the application of real options theory to alliances, 
has been conducted by Kogut in 1991, with his article “Joint Ventures and the Option to 
Expand and Acquire”.  
According to Kogut (1991) joint ventures can be seen as strategic options. Specifically, the 
study, which is based upon data of 92 manufacturing joint ventures in the United States of 
America (USA), suggests the perception of joint ventures as real options to expand. Kogut 
(1991) assumes that “The exercise of the option is accompanied by an acquisition of the 
venture.”(Kogut 1991, p.19). Therefore the joint venture itself operates as a real option to 
expand, which is terminated by the buyout of one partner. In detail Kogut (1991) divides 
the process of exercising the option into a decision of divestment and a decision of 
acquisition. This strategy towards expansion reacts to market developments and future 
technological opportunities. Especially in market environments characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty, joint ventures, as instruments of sequential market entry, hold the 
advantage of sharing risks, costs and gains with a partner. Therefore joint ventures hold the 
potential to decrease total investment costs for each partner.  
Kogut (1991) distinguishes between two types of acquisition in regard to the underlying 
motivation. The joint venture purchases, which are motivated through industry conditions, 
and those, that are initiated via “(…) the desire to expand in response to favourable growth 
opportunities.“(Kogut 1991, p.20). Kogut (1991) addresses one delicate problem, the 
identification of the motivation for the acquisition of a joint venture. It might occur, that 
the primary motivation of a joint venture follows an intention towards risk reduction, 
instead of gaining the option to expand in a new market. This problem of heterogeneity in 
the motivation for joint ventures complicates the classification of joint ventures as real 
options and aggravates the valuation of joint ventures as real options. 
As Kogut (1991) understands the joint venture as a call option, the timing of exercise of 
the option to expand is assumed to follow the basic principles of real options theory. Hence 
the acquisition of the venture takes place when the perceived value of the buyer exceeds 
the exercise price. The decision to expire the option is driven by two main factors: “the 
initial base rate forecast underlying the valuation of the business and the value of the 
venture to each party (or third parties) as realized over time.“(Kogut 1991, p. 24). The 
relationship between these two factors is summarized in Kogut’s (1991) hypothesis that 
“The venture will be acquired when its valuation exceeds the base rate forecast.”(Kogut 
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1991, p.24). However is it essential to notice, that Kogut’s (1991) considerations refer to 
determinations of the option value ex post.  
Further Kogut (1991) emphasizes the critical role of learning and pre-emption in a joint 
venture. The joint venture offers the partners the possibility to learn in terms of 
technology, but also in regard to managerial skills. 
Kogut (1991) suggests that the exercise of the option to expand, namely the acquisition of 
the venture by one of the partners, will be triggered by a certain signal. The hypothesis 
following this logic states that the timing of the exercise of the option should be initiated 
by a product market signal, “(…) indicating an increase in the venture’s valuation.”(Kogut 
1991, p.19). Results show that an unexpected growth in the product market lead to a 
tendency towards acquisition, whereas unexpected shortfalls in product shipments have no 
effect on the exercise of the option. Therefore Kogut (1991) states “For if joint ventures 
are designed as options, then as long as the investment is sunk and the operating costs are 
moderate, downward movements should not lead to dissolution.”(Kogut 1991, p.31). 
Hence it should lead to a process of waiting. Consequently, the prediction for the reaction 
of managers to short term market changes would lead to a process of waiting and learning. 
The results suggest that the decision of manager to acquire a joint venture  “(…) is more 
significantly sensitive to annual departures from a long- term trend than to short- term 
indices of industry growth.”(Kogut 1991, p.29). In case of negative short- term shocks, 
managers will tend to wait until the outcomes become more favourable. As the variable for 
growth turns out to have a positive effect on acquisition, “(…) acquisitions tend to occur 
when the market does better than its historical record.”(Kogut 1991, p.30). 
Further the concentration of the industry is assumed to have an effect on the acquisition 
decision in joint ventures. In industries where there are few competitors the vehicle of a JV 
to acquire is perceived to be important, because “In concentrated industries, joint ventures 
appear to be used as an intermediary step towards a complete acquisition.”(Kogut 1991, 
p.29). In summary the parameters, which increase the possibility of an acquisition of the 
joint venture, identified by Kogut (1991) are: “(…) unexpected increases in the value of 
the venture and the degree of concentration in the industry.“(Kogut 1991, p.31). However, 
the statistical results show no support that a rise in the likelihood of acquisition may be 
caused by consolidation. Moreover the results reveal that acquisition of the venture is more 
likely in ventures with research and development (R&D) activities or marketing and in 
ventures concentrating on distribution activities. (Kogut 1991) 
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The results of the study support Kogut’s (1991) idea that joint ventures ”(…) serve as 
platforms for possible future development.“(Kogut 1991, p.32). 
Kogut’s (1991) considerations are of importance because they reveal the possibility to 
perceive joint ventures as a vehicle of sequential market entry, which act like real options 
to expand.  
Chi and McGuire (1996) present another article, which focuses on joint ventures as real 
options. In their approach they formulate a model, which aims to explain the strategic 
choice between a collaborative venture (CV) and solitaire market entry. Chi and McGuire 
(1996) deduce a two- stage binomial model, which has its source in the financial option 
pricing model. Additionally to the real options arguments Chi and McGuire integrate 
transaction cost economics to their considerations. The initial stage of the model deals with 
the formation of the CV. The second stage is utilized to resolve uncertainty. The learning 
process starts at the very beginning of the CV and can be beneficial in order to learn more 
about the partner with the prevision of possible future expansion or acquisition. As a 
consequence the CV is seen to be a combined option, an option to learn, to expand and to 
grow.  (Chi/McGuire 1996) 
By definition CVs can include both, shared equity collaborations and ventures without 
equity shares between the partners. Chi and McGuire (1996) analyse in their study mainly 
equity joint ventures. In this context the authors propose the hypothesis, which might be 
tested in future research, that “A JV partner is more likely to have a lower equity share 
ceteris paribus when it holds an option to acquire the other’s ownership stake at a 
predetermined price than if it does not hold such an option.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.303). 
This hypothesis entails the question, if the likelihood for holding an option to acquire in 
franchising compared to joint ventures is per se higher, due to the lack or low degree of 
equity ownership.  
Chi and McGuire (1996) enhance the importance of the partners’ differences in ex post 
valuations of the venture and ex ante asymmetries. Further their model combines two 
forms of uncertainty, which will be discussed in chapter 5.4.1, “Uncertainty”.  
The results of Chi and McGuire’s (1996) investigations allude to the possibility that the 
options enclosed in the CV might influence the multinational enterprise’s (MNE) choice of 
market entry mode. Chi and McGuire (1996) give a formula for calculating the expected 
return for an MNE from the venture in the presence of the enclosed options. The authors 
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declare that, “(…) the embedding of strategic options in a particular mode of operation can 
alter the MNE’s assessment of different market entry modes.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.291).  
Folta (1998) is another author, who has realized that “(…) the real option framework is a 
valuable tool for understanding governance choice.”(Folta 1998, p.1023). 
Folta (1998) analyses also joint ventures as real options, but enriches the theoretical 
observations by minority direct investment. Therefore Folta (1998) assumes minority 
direct investments as well as joint ventures to be an “(…) option to defer either internal 
development or acquisition of a target firm or venture.”(Folta 1998, p.1008). The study 
shows motives, why to use equity-based collaborations versus outright acquisition of a 
target firm. Following classical real option theory arguments Folta (1998) suppose that, 
“(…) the option to defer acquisition might create cash flow advantages relative to outright 
acquisition.”(Folta 1998, p.1025). 
The role and distinction of differing uncertainties (e.g., technological uncertainty) are 
examined. “The findings suggest that the cost of commitment in the face of technological 
uncertainty may offset the administrative benefits of hierarchical governance.”(Folta 1998, 
p.1007) The results suggest that, minority investments would be preferred over joint 
ventures in case of dissimilar partners and when technology value is high. Conversely, 
joint ventures are favoured instead of minority investments in case of more rivals. (Folta 
1998) 
Furthermore the article proclaims that, “(…) equity collaborations provide a mechanism to 
capitalize in growth options.”(Folta 1998, p.1008). Hence Folta (1998) discusses the dual 
role and the relationship of the option to defer and the option to grow. 
Reuer and Tong (2005) widened the considerations of real options in alliances by adding 
an international perspective. In Reuer and Tong (2005) the utilization of explicit call 
options to purchase equity in international joint ventures (IJVs) is analysed. It is important 
to notice the fact that this study focuses on the buy side of explicit call options and uses 
also transaction cost arguments. The statistical analysis is based upon data from IJVs 
formed during the years 1995-2002, which are defined as equity joint venture based 
outside the USA with at least one partner being an US firm.  
Reuer and Tong (2005) have realized that real options theory “(…) emphasizes the 
dynamic gains that firms may realize by using JVs as transitory investment structures in 
the presence of various uncertainties.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.404). For IJVs Reuer and 
Tong (2005) argue that call options can “(…) help to facilitate the implementation of a 
sequential investment strategy (…)”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.418).  
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As demonstrated above most studies recognize the non- equity entry mode as a value 
adding form of a sequential market entry strategy. Therefore the option to defer investment 
is assumed to play a significant role in respect to the gain in value for the firm. Folta, 
Johnson and O’Brien (2006) aim to explain the driving factors for making the option to 
defer a valuable instrument to the investing firm. As the option to defer is of lower value, 
the probability of a market entry is higher. Contrarily, a high value of the option to defer 
might lead to sequential market entry. This argument relies on the principle prediction of 
real options approach that, “(…) the firm faces additional opportunity costs due to the loss 
of flexibility that results from “committed”, difficult to reverse actions.“(Folta/ Johnson/ 
O’Brien 2006, p.434). Folta, Johnson and O’Brien (2006) analyse the resulting 
irreversibility of investment and the degree of uncertainty in terms of its influence on the 
market entry decision. Furthermore Folta, Johnson and O’Brien (2006) recognized the 
existence of interaction effects between uncertainty and irreversibility. A crucial closing 
statement of the study is that, “The evidence suggests that real option theory illuminates 
the determinants of both industry and firm-specific entry thresholds and implies that 
managers give weight to real options when they make entry decisions.“(Folta/ Johnson/ 
O’Brien 2006, p.450). 
Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) investigated the application of the real 
option perspective on technological joint ventures (TJVs). Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-
Cruz (2010) state that, “(…) TJVs are analogous to financial call options in the sense that 
they provide their partners the right (not the obligation) to internalize the technology 
involved in the alliance (underlying asset) at a specific price (exercise price) at or before a 
specific date (expiration date).”(Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010, p.1185). 
Therefore the study aims to identify conditions, which are essential factors for the TJV’s 
formation. The statistical results, based upon data of 4050 Spanish manufacturing firms in 
an eight-year time span, suggest a positive relationship between the TJV’s formation and 
the degree of environmental technological uncertainty and the absorptive capacity of the 
TJV. On the contrary, opportunity costs and the risk of pre-emption by rivals seems to 
influence TJV’s building in a negative way. Still Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz 
(2010) confirm the real options approach by recognizing that TJVs can be seen as options 
to defer and as growth options for future technological expansion. Hence Estrada, De la 
Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) mention, “When a firm forms a TJV, it accesses a growth 
option for future technological expansion, while retaining the option to defer full 
commitment to this technology (…).”(Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010, p.1186). 
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Cuypers and Martin (2010) mention that research of the real options approach in regard to 
joint ventures (JVs) developed into two directions: The first stream deals with the 
empirical investigation of the fit between JV decisions with real options theory. The 
second stream analyses how flexibility can create value, through investigating the possible 
costs and benefits of investment in strategic real options with formal models. The 
empirical study of Cuypers and Martin (2010) is based upon data on equity JVs, 
established in China between 1979 and 1996 with one foreign partner involved. The JVs 
used in the study are spread over China’s geographic area and operate in 59 distinct 
industries. Interestingly, the legal system in China prescribes, that for international joint 
ventures (IJVs) located in China the articles of association must contain an arrangement of 
the pricing mechanism, in order to value the JV in case of termination, and must include 
the contractual duration of the JV ex ante. Therefore the IJV formed in China can be 
perceived as a type of explicit real option, with its pre-specified criteria for valuation and 
duration of the agreement. Further Cuypers and Martin (2010) interviewed managers to 
verify on a qualitative level, what intentions drive the strategic decision of forming an IJV. 
As an example Cuypers and Martin (2010) cite one manager of an electronic firm’s JV, 
who states that due to the unpredictability of the Chinese market, a real options approach 
has been used to structure the firms investments. (Cuypers/ Martin 2010) Hence, IJVs can 
be viewed as option like instruments in order to enter a foreign market sequentially. 
Cuypers and Martin (2010) results show “(…) that a real options perspective can be useful 
in modeling equity share decisions in JVs (…)“(Cuypers/ Martin 2010, p.63). 
As demonstrated by the above-mentioned studies, JVs, TJVs and IJVs can be seen as real 
options. In the latter, the assumption of franchising as a real option, in analogy of viewing 
entry modes in general as real options, will be of importance.  
4.1.2 Licensing	  
The next section focuses on the application of the real options approach to licensing. 
According to the licensing industry merchandiser’s association (LIMA), “A license is an 
agreement through which a licensee leases the rights to a legally protected piece of 
intellectual property from a licensor – the entity which owns or represents the property — 
for use in conjunction with a product or service.“3 
                                                
3 LIMA, URL: http://www.licensing.org/education/introduction-to-licensing/ ; last access 15th May 2012. 
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The license is in most cases based upon a contractual agreement between the licensor and 
the licensee. The main difference between licensing and joint ventures, in terms of real 
option arguments, is the point in time, when expiration of the option takes place. In open- 
ended joint ventures the option holder has the right, but not the obligation to exercise the 
option at any favourable point in time, whereas in licensing the expiration of the option is 
determined by the end of the licensing agreement.  
 
Aulakh, Jiang and Pan (2009) showed that licensing represents an agreement with a pre- 
specified duration. As the duration of the licensing agreement is fixed ex ante in the 
contract, an analogy to a European real option is drawn. An empirical test model is derived 
in order to explain factors influencing the duration of a licensing agreement. The results 
reveal the negative effect of uncertainty and risk of pre-emption by competitors on the 
duration of the licensing agreement. The moderating effect of irreversibility for the relation 
between the duration of the agreement and uncertainty is integrated in the model. 
Therefore, in case of low levels of irreversibility contracts under market and technological 
uncertainty appear to include shorter durations. 
The study “(…) broadens the domain of real options research to include licensing as a tool 
that firms use to explore growth opportunities in foreign markets.“(Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 
2009, p.572) 
As demonstrated above, real options theory is applicable to market entry mode decisions 
and leads in case of joint ventures and licensing to the existence of valuable growth 
options.  
4.2 Option	  Clauses	  in	  Alliances	  
In order to stipulate the options embodied in alliances, contracts are provided with detailed 
option clauses. The aim of such clauses is to ascertain the rights of each party ex ante and 
in succession to avoid costly and time- consuming ex post negotiations. Following real 
options arguments such option clauses help to stipulate the right to the option, and enable 
the option holder to benefit from future opportunities, while limiting downside risk. 
In regard to joint ventures Kogut (1991) explains the reason for an option clause: “The 
legal clause serves to regulate the assignation of the right to the underlying option. Such a 
clause may establish not only who has the first right to acquire, but also may set pricing 
rules.”(Kogut 1991, p.20). However an essential remark of Kogut (1991) is that the option 
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clause, as it secures the right to the underlying option, should not be mistaken with the 
option itself. (Kogut 1991) 
Furthermore Ziedonis (2007) states that, “(…) contracts granting one party the explicit 
right to exercise an option are rarely observed.”(Ziedonis  2007, p.1619). Ziedonis (2007) 
criticizes the gap in research, which has not been narrowed by studies, such as Kogut 
(1991) and Folta and Miller (2002), in terms of explicit ex ante option clauses in 
contractual agreements. 
However some studies (Chi/ McGuire 1996, Ziedonis 2007) aim to consider explicit option 
clauses in contractual agreements of alliances. 
4.2.1 Option	  Clauses	  in	  Joint	  Ventures	  and	  International	  Joint	  Ventures	  
Chi and McGuire (1996) focus in their study on the firm’s evaluation of collaborative 
ventures (CVs) as entry modes. Therefore a CV is perceived to act as an option to learn, to 
expand and to grow, as at the time of expiration one partner acquires the CV. The right to 
the option to acquire the CV will be fixed in an option clause. The question is: “Under 
what conditions would the two parties find it mutually beneficial to have such option 
clauses in their JV agreements?”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.292). To answer this question Chi 
and McGuire (1996) use a game theoretic approach, with the assumption that each party 
acts in order to maximize its expected gains (and anticipate the other party to follow the 
same strategy). The process of the joint venture (JV) creation is split into two stages. The 
first stage represents the negotiation process of the JV’s contract and its implementation in 
the second stage. The party that values the venture more at the second stage, will have a 
greater incentive to buy out the other, given the assumption that the two parties happen to 
have divergent valuations of the venture at stage 2.  
Hence one essential requirement for the option clause to provide value is “(…) that the 
partners anticipate a possible divergence between their ex post valuations of the JV.”(Chi/ 
McGuire 1996, p.295). 
Whereas Kogut (1991) follows the idea that the reason for a JV partner to buy out the other 
partner might source in the differing ex post evaluations of the assets of the JV, Chi and 
McGuire (1996) rather suggest that the “ex ante anticipation of the possibility of such ex 
post differences can by itself be one of the motives for their going into a JV in the first 
place.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.295). 
 40 
Hence Chi and McGuire (1996) proclaim the existence of an ex ante asymmetry in the 
expectations of the JV partners. According to Chi and McGuire (1996) this ex ante 
asymmetry emerges when: 
a) One partner perceives less probability of valuing the JV more than the other. 
b) The partners anticipate different abilities to absorb knowledge in the JV. 
c) The partners foresee differing levels of uncertainty about the JV‘s outcome. 
 
The ex ante asymmetry causes one of the partners “(…) to value the option more than the 
other partner does.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.296). Chi and McGuire (1996) present various 
transaction cost- related factors that can give rise to ex ante and ex post asymmetries 
between JV partners. Therefore the analysis deals with misappropriation risk and 
information asymmetry.  
Further the motivation to utilize an option clause in a JV contract is identified by Chi and 
McGuire (1996) to source in the combination of three conditions: 
1. The “(…) existence of uncertainty and learning potential (…)”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, 
p.301). This condition is of importance for the ability to gain additional value 
through the option. 
2. The expectation of a “(…) shift in the bargaining power of the two partners in the 
course of their collaboration.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.301). This anticipation of an 
expected change in the bargaining power acts as an incentive to fix acquisition 
price ex ante in the contract. 
3. The “(…) existence of some ex ante asymmetry in the expected gains from 
acquiring the JV.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.301). 
 
Those conditions happen to be present in almost every JV in differing levels of strength. If 
an option- to- acquire clause will be implemented in a contract depends on the strength of 
the above-mentioned conditions. An increase in one of the conditions might lead to the 
implementation of an option clause. (Chi/ McGuire 1996) 
 
In the same context Folta (1998) raises the question, why do future technology sellers 
subject themselves to the future buyout by the partner, and answers the question with 
regard to the capabilities of the partners at the initial negotiation stage.  
Hence the reason for the existence of an option clause in the initial contract may be “(…) 
asymmetric bargaining power during the negotiation process (…)”(Folta 1998, p.1025).  
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This point seems to be of particular importance in regard to franchising agreements, as 
usually the franchisor holds more bargaining power than the franchisee.  
Further Folta (1998), who is using transaction cost arguments as well, mentions that, 
“Restrictions on either partner’s rights to buy out the other can be used to prevent 
premature termination of a relationship.”(Folta 1998, p.1025). The longer duration of the 
option to defer acquisition offers the firm the possibility to gain from potential future cash 
flows. As Folta (1998) understands equity collaborations as options to defer acquisition, 
option clauses help to assure the claims on future gains. Therefore Folta (1998) states that, 
“The rights accompanying theses transactions serve to facilitate upside gains and pre-empt 
competitors.”(Folta 1998, p.1025) The facilitation of potential upside gains represents a 
real options argument, whereas to forestall competitors is rather argued via transaction 
costs logic. 
 
Reuer and Tong (2005) investigate the intentions for using an option clause in international 
joint ventures (IJVs). The buying out of one IJV partner is regulated via an explicit call 
option in the contract. The option to acquire the IJV is said to be explicit, due to the fact 
that the option is fixed in the contract in an explicit way ex ante and is not solely 
negotiated ex post. Reuer and Tong’s (2005) approach is more distinct, than the general 
considerations of JVs as real options (Kogut 1991), due to the fact that Reuer and Tong 
(2005) concentrate on options clauses in IJVs. Reuer and Tong (2005) perceive the explicit 
call option to be an important contractual instrument in order to provide a firm with the 
possibility to secure a claim on:  
a.) “(…) future expansion opportunities (…)”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.403), and 
b.) act as safeguards. 
Reuer and Tong (2005) use as well transaction cost arguments (protecting firms from 
contractual hazards, option as a safeguard) as real option arguments (helping firms to claim 
upside opportunities through sequential expansion) in developing their hypotheses. The 
research question is: “Under what conditions do firms use such clauses when forming 
international joint ventures (IJVs)?”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.404). The determination of 
conditions for the use of a legal clause, outlining the option to purchase an IJV, is essential, 
when following the basic real options assumption that an option clause might result in 
additional value for the firm holding the option.  
In Reuer and Tong’s (2005) perception, their approach contributes to real options research 
for three causes:  
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1. The “(…) gains the buyer potentially attains from acquiring equity in a JV ex post 
can be influenced by the ex ante specification of the call option clause.”(Reuer/ 
Tong 2005, p.406). Therefore the legal right of the option holder to purchase 
equity at the end of the IJV is decisive for the value of the option. Hence the option 
value of engaging in the IJV is lower, in case of a lack of an option- to- acquire 
clause in the contract.  
2. To know the conditions under which a IJVs have an option-to- acquire clause is 
necessary to understand the parent firms’ intentions for creating IJVs. So far 
research (Kogut 1991, Chi/ McGuire 1996) has suggested implicitly the JV to be 
an option to expand sequentially and an opportunity to limit risk.  
3. The negotiation of explicit call options can also be seen from a governance 
perspective and not only from a sequential expansion perspective. “Explicit call 
options serve not only as future claims but also as contractual safeguards.”(Reuer/ 
Tong 2005, p.407) The option to acquire is also the right to change a hybrid 
governance structure into a hierarchical one.  
 
Further the presence or absence of explicit call options can have “(…) important 
implications for partners’ incentives (…)”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.407) and can be 
advantageous for the parent firm in regard to “(…) manage its exposure to contractual 
hazards.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.407).  
As a result of Reuer and Tong’s (2005) study the value of an option with an option- to- 
acquire clause seems to be higher, than without such a clause. This cognition sources in the 
fact that, “(…) for a real option to be present, the firm must have the right but not the 
obligation, to undertake some future specified action, enabling it to reduce downside risk 
while exploiting upside opportunities.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.419). Consequently, the 
absence of an explicit call option may result in not having the “right” to strike the option to 
expand. In this context managers should regard the evident fact that, “Without a secure 
right specified in the form of a contractual clause ex ante, much of the potential value 
created as suggested by real options theory may well be appropriated by the parties selling 
the equity ex post.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.419) 
 
As demonstrated, the existence of an option clause is driven by some ex ante asymmetry in 
the anticipation of the partners, concerning the future opportunities of a project. Further the 
existence of the explicit option clause increases the value of the underlying option. In case 
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of joint ventures (JVs) or investments in research and development projects, the option 
clause ascertains the right to the underlying call option. So far, research (Kogut 1991, 
Chi/McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005) for JVs has not specified the 
underlying option to be an American or European styled one. In the event of the possibility 
to expire the option at any point in time during the venture, an American option exists, 
whereas in case of a contractual fixed duration of the collaborative venture, a European- 
styled option is created. The specific form of licensing is going to be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.2.2 Option	  clauses	  in	  Licensing	  
Aulakh, Jiang and Pan (2009) demonstrated in their study, that licensing refers to a 
European call option. As the duration of a licensing agreement is fixed in the licensing 
contract ex ante, licensing, as an entry mode with the option to grow, can be perceived as a 
European- styled call option. Concerning this specific form of option, the decision of the 
timing, when to expire the option, has to take place ex ante, in order to be regulated in the 
licensing contract. (Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009) 
 
Ziedonis (2007) investigates the licensing of university technologies. In detail Ziednois 
(2007) focuses on “(…) instances where firms purchased option contracts that explicitly 
confer the right but not the obligation to license a technology at the end of the contract 
term.“(Ziedonis 2007, p.1620). Therefore Ziedonis (2007) analyses option contracts of 
companies purchasing the right to commercialize new technologies developed on 
universities. This option contracts enable the licensee the staging of investment. In case of 
the emerging of unfavourable information the investment in a university technology can be 
stopped. In this sense the licensee can profit from upside opportunities, while mitigate 
downside risk of investment in a new technology. (Ziedonis 2007) 
The possibility to resolve various uncertainties over the duration of an option contract is 
the basic real option argument, why option contracts provide additional value to a firm. 
Therefore Ziedonis (2007) states that, “Contractual requirements that the firm evaluate the 
technology in-house are designed to facilitate the resolution of endogenous uncertainty—
uncertainty that firms can reduce through their own efforts.”(Ziedonis 2007, p. 1619). The 
short duration, often one or two years, of the new technology contracts, makes the 
resolution of exogenous uncertainty more difficult. 
Ziedonis (2007) emphasizes the importance of verifying the basic tenets of real options 
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theory and addresses the lack of empirical work focussing on option contracts. In this 
context Ziedonis (2007) mentions that, “Because much of the empirical literature on the 
use of “options” in technology acquisition and management relies on “virtual” or 
“implied” options, the exploita- tion of actual option agreements in an empirical study 
represents an important contribution to the literature.“(Ziedonis 2007, p.1630). 
In summary, contractual licensing agreements with a fixed duration ex ante can be seen as 
valuable European call options. Further licensing contracts may help to regulate the staging 
of investment in order to explore new technologies or new markets, and to benefit from 
future opportunities.  
4.3 Combined	  Approaches	  in	  Research	  
Although real options theory might be a helpful instrument in order to understand 
managerial decision making, it is important to keep in mind, that other theories, like 
transaction costs approach or resource based view will not be fully replaced. In fact the 
real options approach should be used as an extension via combining real options 
considerations with the existing theories in order to gain new perspectives.  
Some research, such as Chi/ McGuire (1996), Folta (1998), Sanchez (2003), and Reuer and 
Tong (2005), already present in their studies a combined approach, by utilizing the real 
options approach and arguments, based in transaction costs theory (Williamson 1979). 
The article of Chi and McGuire (1996) offers a model to investigate how transaction costs 
and strategic option considerations interact in order to impact an organization’s evaluation 
of collaborative venturing as a market entry mode. (Chi/ McGuire 1996) 
Folta (1998) recognizes the importance of real options approach as it „(...) can make a 
contribution in the context of governance choice.“(Folta 1998, p.1026). Further, 
concerning the transaction costs perspective Folta (1998) states that the results of the study 
lend support to the transaction costs perspective and does not discredit the real options 
approach. 
Aulakh, Jiang and Pan (2009) suggest a compound approach of real options theory and 
resource- based view for future research. The argument of Aulakh, Jiang and Pan (2009) 
for a connection of the two theories is based upon the idea that “(…) both perspectives 
examine the effective deployment of resources for future development 
opportunities.“(Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009, p.573). 
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Beside the transaction costs theory Leiblein (2003) integrates the resource- based view into 
his study as well. Leiblein (2003) supports the opinion that a separation of the three 
theoretical approaches might lead to misconceptions and combines transaction costs 
theory, resource- based view and real options approach. Leiblein (2003) presents 
interrelated problems, which should be solved by managers, and which might provide a 
linkage of the three above- mentioned theoretical concepts. The first one refers to the 
identification and assembly of a bundle of resources that create value. The second problem 
deals with the governance of the resource bundle in order to capture this value. Whereas 
the first problem can be faced with the real options approach and the resource- based view, 
the second governance problem can be rather analysed with the transaction costs approach. 
(Leiblein 2003) 
Leiblein (2003) showed “(…) how the resources and investment opportunities identified by 
the RBV and the Real Options approaches affect the relationship between exchange 
characteristics and governance choice identified by TCE.”(Leiblein 2003, p.956). 
Further the “(…) potential sources of integration between these theories of organizational 
form and performance.“(Leiblein 2003, p.952) should be investigated in more detail in 
future research.  
Based on the above- mentioned arguments, a combined approach will enrich research 
perspectives. Therefore the integration of real options theory, resources- based view and 
transaction costs economics acts supportive to gain better insight in managerial decision- 
making.  
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5. Franchising	  and	  the	  Real	  Options	  Approach	  
5.1 Franchising	  
According to an explanation of the European Franchise Federation (EFF) “(…) franchising 
is a business model aimed at the distribution of goods and/or services based on the 
licensing of a brand, a set of intellectual property rights (the brand names, trademarks or 
trade names associated with the brand), a business format – bundled and sold as an asset.”4 
In more detail the European Code of Ethics for Franchising (ECEF) defines franchising as 
follows: “Franchising is a system of marketing goods and/or services and/or technology, 
which is based upon a close and ongoing collaboration between legally and financially 
separate and independent undertakings, the Franchisor and its individual Franchisees, 
whereby the Franchisor grants its individual Franchisee the right, and imposes the 
obligation, to conduct a business in accordance with the Franchisor's concept.“(EFEC 
2008, p.3). 
As in the latter empirical study (Chapter 6, “Empirical Study”) only German franchises are 
analysed, it is important to mention the fact that the German franchise association 
(Deutscher Franchise Verband) commit itself to follow the ECEF. Although Germany adds 
a national annex, which concerns guidelines to pre-contractual disclosure, to the ECEF, the 
code is a widely used guideline for the members of the German franchise association.  
Another definition by Dnes (1992) states: „A franchise is created when one party, the 
franchisor, allows another, the franchisee, to use his trade name in operating a satellite 
business in return for fees.  Associated franchise services, such as store design, training or 
the supply of products, may also be provided by the franchisor.“(Dnes 1992, p.3). The 
franchisee has to pay an initial fee at the beginning of the franchise and royalty fees during 
the operation of the franchise to the franchisor. The franchisor and the franchisee have 
several rights, but also obligations towards each other. Most of these obligations may be 
regulated in the franchise agreement. In this context, “(…) a franchise agreement is most 
often understood as a contractual arrangement between two legally independent firms in 
which one firm, the franchisee, pays the other firm, the franchisor, for the right to sell the 
franchisor’s product and /or the right to use its trademarks and business format in a given 
location for a specific period of time.”(Blair/ Lafontaine 2005, p.3).  
Other agreements, which are easily confused with franchising are for example, exclusive 
                                                
4 EFF, URL: http://www.eff-franchise.com/spip.php?rubrique6 ; last access 15th May 2012. 
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or selective distribution agreements, cooperatives, agency agreements, etc..5 
The advantages of franchising are for instance: centralized purchasing and consequently 
expenditure savings, national-wide advertising, professional management and long term 
strategy, central and standardized trainings and consistent support. (Wildhaber 2003) 
Therefore, according to the EFF, the franchisor is in charge of:  
• “developing and constantly improving the franchise business’s concept so as to 
ensure the credibility, quality and notoriety of the brand on the market, 
• constantly improving the “franchise package” offered to the franchisee which 
includes: - seeking and guaranteeing better purchasing prices for goods and 
services, - optimising management and sales skills through on-going training, 
• organising national or international advertising campaigns, 
• steering the business’s overall development strategy.”6 
Furthermore, the franchisee is responsible for: 
• “guaranteeing the customer the best possible service, 
• optimising his sales force and results, 
• respecting the principles and manner of operating of the franchise business as 
defined in the franchise contract, which includes respecting the common identity 
and reputation of the franchise network, and the confidentiality of the business 
know-how transferred.”7 
As the questionnaire for the empirical study (see Chapter 12, “Appendix” and Chapter 6, 
“Empirical Study") was addressed to franchisors in Germany, the following considerations 
are drawn from the franchisor’s perspective. Accordingly to the analogy of real options 
and several foreign market entry modes (joint ventures, licensing), the question emerges if 
franchising itself can be seen as a real option. In this sense the franchisor holds and option 
to learn, expand, and grow. The distinction between the two possible views (see Chapter 4, 
“Real Options in Alliances”), namely the entry mode itself as a real option or the option 
clause in the contractual agreement as a real option, can be applied to franchising as well. 
Despite the fact that additional research on the question, if franchising itself can be viewed 
as a real option should be conducted, the focus will be on real option clauses in franchising 
contracts, in order to set the research questions for the empirical study. (see Chapter 6, 
“Empirical Study") 
                                                
5 EFF, URL: http://www.eff-franchise.com/spip.php?rubrique6 ; last access 15th May 2012. 
6 EFF, URL: http://www.eff-franchise.com/spip.php?rubrique6 ; last access 15th May 2012. 
7 EFF, URL: http://www.eff-franchise.com/spip.php?rubrique6 ; last access 15th May 2012. 
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5.2 Real	  Option	  Clauses	  in	  Franchising	  Contracts	  
Although research has already investigated real option clauses in joint ventures (Chi/ 
McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, etc.) and in licensing agreements (Ziedonis 
2007, Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009  etc.), the comparable studies for franchising do not exist so 
far.  
In the questionnaire (see Chapter 12, “Appendix”) one question, with the possibility to 
answer with “yes” or “no” was: “the franchisor has a contractual option to buy the 
franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-emption)”(“Der Franchisegeber hat 
vertragliche Optionsrechte bei Veräußerung des Franchisebetriebes durch den 
Franchisenehmer (z.B.: Vorkaufsrecht).”).  
In regard to franchising, the right of pre-emption, which is normally fixed in an option 
clause in the franchising contract, describes the right but not the obligation of the 
franchisor to acquire the franchise after the termination of the franchising agreement in 
advance to all other potential buyers. Basically it is possible to grant the right of pre-
emption to the franchisor as well as to the franchisee. The advantages of an option clause 
to acquire for the franchisor are the prevention of the misappropriation of know- how and 
brand name by a third party. Beside the controlling function, the right of pre-emption acts 
as an incentive for the franchisor to behave efficiently in regard to the franchise. (Taheri 
2002) 
According to the ECEF (2008) the franchise agreement should include at least the 
following essential terms:” 
• the rights granted to the Franchisor  
• the rights granted to the Individual Franchisee  
• the goods and/or services to be provided to the Individual Franchisee  
• the obligations of the Franchisor 
• the obligations of the Individual Franchisee  
• the terms of payment by the Individual Franchisee  
• the duration of the agreement which should be long enough to allow Individual 
Franchisees to amortize their initial investments specific to the franchise  
• the basis for any renewal of the agreement  
• the terms upon which the Individual Franchisee may sell or transfer the 
franchised business and the Franchisor's possible pre-emption rights in this 
respect 
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• provisions relevant to the use by the Individual Franchisee of the Franchisor's 
distinctive signs, trade name, trademark, service mark, store sign, logo or other 
distinguishing identification  
• the Franchisor's right to adapt the franchise system to new or changed methods  
• provisions for termination of the agreement  
• provisions for surrendering promptly upon termination of the franchise agreement 
any tangible and intangible property belonging to the Franchisor or other owner 
thereof.”(ECEF 2008, p.6). 
 
However, not all of the interviewed German firms, have an option clause, concerning the 
franchisor’s right of pre-emption, in their contract. Following real options approach, the 
right of acquiring the franchise, can be seen form the franchisors’ perspective, as a 
European call option. The option is European- styled, due to the fact that the franchisor is 
not in the position to choose the point in time, when the option is going to be expired. The 
expiration date is rather fixed by the decision of the franchisee to sell at a specific point in 
time.  
As the following considerations and the study are based upon the franchisors perspective, 
the focus will be on explicit (contractual fixed) option clauses to acquire, hold by the 
franchisor. 
5.3 Considerations	  
In order to derive several hypotheses, some main considerations and assumptions about 
franchising in respect to the real options approach should be mentioned. Most of those 
considerations are drawn in analogy to financial options theory and to the above- 
mentioned real options literature (Chapter 3, “Real Option Theory” and Chapter 4, “Real 
Options in Alliances”) dealing with alliances.  
Firstly, franchising is seen as an option to expand, namely as a form of sequential market 
entry. Hence franchising itself represents a growth option. The option holder is the 
franchisor.  
Secondly, the option clause is the legal regulation, which constitutes the right of the option 
on the underlying. In the following the option clause, which fixes the franchisor’s right of 
pre- emption will be analysed. Therefore, the existence of an option clause stipulates an 
explicit call option (the franchisor has the right of pre-emption). 
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Thirdly, based upon financial options theory, the assumption is made that, the existence of 
an option clause enhances the value of the franchising arrangement for the franchisor 
(option holder).  
Fourthly, the option clause only adds value to the firm, if the franchisor has the ex ante 
anticipation of an increase in the value of the underlying ex post. 
Fifthly, it is presumed, that the franchisor has a bigger firm size than the franchisee. 
The considerations are drawn from the franchisor’s perspective, as the questionnaire was 
addressed to the franchisor. 
 
In the following, an attempt is made to derive five hypotheses for describing the 
relationship between the possibility of an option clause existence in the franchise 
agreement and several factors. In analogy to the existing real options literature for 
alliances, factors are chosen in order to test, whether they have a significant influence in 
the area of franchising as well. In the next Chapter 5.4, “Hypotheses”, the above- 
mentioned assumptions and considerations are presumed. 
5.4 Hypotheses	  
In the following section, five hypotheses, emerging from the review of the theoretical 
literature, are going to be presented. Due to the lack of literature for the application of the 
real options approach to franchising, analogies are drawn from research of joint ventures 
and licensing, in order to derive hypotheses for franchising agreements. The hypotheses 
address topics, such as uncertainty, the duration of the franchising arrangement, know- 
how transferability and the sector of operations. In terms of uncertainty, a differentiation 
between perceived environmental uncertainty and perceived behavioural uncertainty is 
conducted. The aim is to analyse, how these factors might influence the likelihood of an 
option clause existing in the franchising contract. The following hypotheses will be 
generated via real options arguments, but also resource- based view considerations are 
integrated (see Chapter 5.4.3, “Know-How Transferability” and Chapter 5.4.4, “Sector of 
Operation”).  
5.4.1 Uncertainty	  
Uncertainty represents one of the main concepts underlying real options theory. Despite 
the various existing definitions of uncertainty, the most relevant for this thesis will be 
presented in the following.  
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The distinction of Knight (1921) between uncertainty and risk forms one crucial 
consideration for real options theory. For Knight (1921) risk can be calculated via the 
probabilities of the outcomes of decisions. This concept resembles rather the idea, based in 
financial option theory, of a random walk of the underlying asset. In real options approach, 
however uncertainty can not be measured solely via probabilities. The available 
information is too imprecise to ascertain an exact mathematical analysis. According to 
Penrose (2009) this lack of information results in a deficit of the manager’s confidence. 
Therefore uncertainty is defined as the manager’s degree of confidence to cope with future 
situations, respectively the manager’s confidence in his expectations or estimates. 
Consequently, gaining new and more information about the determinants of uncertainty 
can only reduce this subjective uncertainty of managers. (Penrose 2009) Hence the 
definition of Penrose (2009) of uncertainty fits better to the concept of real options. 
Further Folta (1998) presents a distinction of two forms of uncertainty:  
a) Endogenous uncertainty, and  
b) Exogenous uncertainty. 
a) “Endogenous uncertainty can be decreased by actions of the firm.”(Folta 1998, p.1010) 
Investments under endogenous uncertainty can be staged, in order to have the possibility of 
incremental learning. At each stage, new information about growth opportunities might be 
gathered. “The greater the endogenous uncertainty, the higher the incentive to invest 
sequentially.”(Folta 1998, p.1011) As a consequence of this sequential investment growth 
options emerge. Further the ability to stop investment at any point in time corresponds to 
compound options. Hence the resolution of endogenous uncertainty might be best 
supported by sequential investment or via transitional governance. (Folta 1998) 
b) In contrary to endogenous uncertainty,“(…) exogenous uncertainty is largely unaffected 
by firm actions (…)”(Folta 1998, p.1011). The essential factor for resolving exogenous 
uncertainty is time. The opportunity of the firm to wait for more information is valuable. 
Examples for exogenous uncertainty might be the lack of information about the potential 
industry, concerning infrastructure, industry specifics, legislation regimes, growth 
potential, etc.. In case of immediate investment (acquisition) instead of waiting, the 
irreversible costs of investment must be complemented by the opportunity costs of 
abdicating the option to defer investment. The risk, emerging from irreversibility of 
investment, is lower when dealing with exogenous uncertainty, which is rather project or 
firm specific, than with exogenous uncertainty, which is rather subfield or industry 
specific. (Folta 1998)  
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Concluding, it can be supposed that if a firm is confronted with endogenous uncertainty, it 
has an incentive to invest, although in a sequential way, whereas if a firm is facing 
exogenous uncertainty, it has rather an incentive to wait.  
In the following, two hypotheses will be derived for the issues of perceived environmental 
uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty.  
5.4.1.1 Perceived	  Environmental	  Uncertainty	  
The term perceived environmental uncertainty refers to the subjective anticipation of 
managers about future events. As managers experience high levels of environmental 
uncertainty their decisions will be affected. In case of real options logic, managers will 
prefer to hold options open, when experiencing high environmental uncertainty. Bowman 
and Hurry (1993) state one of the basic principles of real options approach, “The value of 
an option increases as the volatility of the underlying asset’s value rises (…)”(Bowman/ 
Hurry 1993, p.766).  In this context it is important to notice, that environmental volatility 
can not only be seen as an external phenomenon, it can be seen as a function of exogenous 
reasons and endogenous reasons, such as organizational learning. As organizations learn 
more about the environment, they perceive less uncertainty. A process of exploration is 
transformed to a process of exploitation until the environment changes eminently. In order 
to react to the environmental changes the organization has to start the process of 
exploration again. Bowman and Hurry (1993) apply this concept of stability and instability 
to the relationship of organizations performance, the opportunities emerging from the 
environment and organization’s investment. (Bowman/ Hurry 1993) Bowman and Hurry’s 
(1993) proposition, based on theoretical considerations, is that “(…) Given realistic 
perceptions of environmental uncertainty, organizations that hold options during unstable 
periods and strike options in stable periods will show superior long-term growth and profit 
performance compared to organizations exhibiting other types of investment.”(Bowman/ 
Hurry 1993, p.767). Hence Bowman and Hurry (1993) recommend managers to face 
environmental uncertainty by applying real options thinking. Therefore the process of 
learning represents one major instrument in order to reduce perceived environmental 
uncertainty.  
The incorporation of new information, which influences the managerial decision- making 
process substantially as a value- adding factor, is also recognized by Chi and McGuire 
(1996). Concerning the value of an option Chi and McGuire (1996) mention that, “(…) the 
value of the option is greater as the option holder experiences higher uncertainty.”(Chi/ 
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McGuire 1996, p.301). The conclusion that the value of the option is influenced by the 
change in uncertainty is not entirely correct, due to the fact that, “It is not the uncertainty 
per se, but rather the potential for improving decisions on the basis of new information 
gathered, that makes the options valuable.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, p.291).  
In Folta (1998) the market value of firms, which operate in emerging industries, is based 
on their future growth options. This consideration forgoes the assumption, that uncertainty 
is higher in emerging industries. Accordingly, Folta (1998) tests the hypothesis that 
“Technological uncertainty should lead to a preference for equity collaboration over 
acquisition.”(Folta 1998, p.1014). The results show strong support for the hypothesis of 
technological (exogenous) uncertainty’s influence on governance decisions. (Folta 1998) 
In respect to licensing Ziedonis (2007) hypothesizes: “The greater the uncertainty 
embodied by an invention, the more likely a firm will purchase an option contract prior to 
making a licensing decision, all else equal.”(Ziedonis 2007, p.1620). The hypothesis finds 
support in the results and affirms the basic principle of real options theory, that the option 
becomes more valuable in case of higher uncertainty. Therefore investment in new 
technologies and inventions is accompanied by a high degree of technological and 
commercial uncertainty. Following the results of Ziedonis (2007) the likelihood of firms to 
purchase option contracts increases with the uncertainty inherent in the invention. 
(Ziedonis 2007) This finding is crucial in regard to franchising contracts, as a higher 
degree of uncertainty embodies a higher possibility for growth options to become more 
valuable over time. In order to ascertain this future opportunity the implementation of an 
option clause in the franchising contract is sensible. 
The distinction between several forms of uncertainty has been investigated in research as 
well and seems to be of significant importance. Referring to international joint ventures 
(IJVs) Cuypers and Martin (2010) show “(…) that normal real options predictions are 
ineffective when uncertainty is resolved endogenously, but all the more powerful when the 
firm faces exogenous uncertainty.”(Cuypers/ Martin 2010, p.64) Cuypers and Martin 
(2010) argue that real options logic is not applicable in case of endogenous uncertainty and 
enumerate three reasons: Firstly, the presumption of financial option theory, of investors as 
price takers is not sufficient for investors confronted with endogenous uncertainty, as they 
can for instance negotiate prices and conditions. This assumption is deduced from the idea 
of financial option theory, that uncertainty is resolved independently from the investor’s 
actions. Secondly, the resolution of endogenous uncertainty is possible through active 
investment. Thirdly, the active response to endogenous uncertainty might lead to further 
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opportunities. (Cuypers/ Martin 2010) Therefore Cuypers and Martin (2010) emphasize 
that the existence of a real option strongly depends on the underlying source of uncertainty, 
which the option is supposed to hedge. As demonstrated Cuypers and Martin (2010) tend 
to question the applicability of the real options approach in case of endogenous 
uncertainty. Cuypers and Martin (2010) criticize Ander and Levinthal (2004) by arguing 
that the costs of minimizing endogenous uncertainty, for instance through control 
mechanisms or organizational changes, might exceed the potential benefits of a real option. 
In addition, Cuypers and Martin (2010) remark that in future studies, the effects of two or 
more different forms of uncertainty should be examined. (Cuypers/ Martin 2010) Still, in 
reality, the strict classification of endogenous or exogenous uncertainty remains 
problematic. 
In the context of technological joint ventures (TJVs) Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-
Cruz (2010) emphasize the advantages of flexibility, emerging from high uncertainty. The 
support of their hypothesis, “The greater the technological uncertainty, the more likely the 
firm is to form a TJV.”(Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010, p.1189), endorses the 
real option approach. Further Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) highlight the 
crucial role of the managers’ perception of technological uncertainty in the managerial 
decision- making process. Therefore it is necessary, to include the managers’ anticipation 
of environmental uncertainty, when analysing real option clauses in franchising contracts.  
Following real options arguments the perception of environmental uncertainty by 
managers, encloses the managers’ expectations of how flexibly the firm may cope with 
new information. Further the perception of environmental uncertainty by managers 
includes the managers’ estimation of the ability of the firm to learn. The value added 
through gaining the possibility to learn is essential, when considering investment projects. 
The additional flexibility adds value to the franchise. Consequently, the possession of a 
real option is particularly valuable under high degrees of perceived environmental 
uncertainty.  
 
H1: The higher the perceived environmental uncertainty, the higher is the likelihood 
of the usage of an option clause.  
 
 55 
5.4.1.2 Behavioural	  Uncertainty	  	  
Besides perceived environmental uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty may affect the 
likelihood of an option clause in a franchising contract. This type of uncertainty refers to 
the lack of knowledge about the partner’s capabilities and resources.  
Folta (1998) addresses this form of uncertainty, when stating that in case of uncertainty 
about the future capabilities of the target firm, “ (…) investments in knowledge should 
have the characteristic of trial-and– error learning.”(Folta 1998, p.1010). Due to the fact 
that the resources and the ability of the partner to exploit them in a profitable way are 
unknown, uncertainty emerges. Along the duration of the option, the partners gain more 
information about each other, and the possibility to improve their decisions rises. This 
flexibility in the decision- making process adds value to the option.  
Chi and McGuire (1996) refer to this problem with the term ‘partner uncertainty’. Chi and 
McGuire (1996) define partner uncertainty by the collaborative experience the partners 
have with each other. They combine market uncertainty  (product is new to the market) 
and partner uncertainty and set the hypothesis that if a product is new to a market, or the 
two partners have no experience with each other, the likelihood of an option clause in JV 
contracts increases. Therefore they hypothesize “A JV is more likely to contain an option-
to-acquire clause ceteris paribus if its product is new to the local market or if its two 
partners have had no prior collaborative experience with each other.”(Chi/ McGuire 1996, 
p.302). Chi and McGuire (1996) assume that an increase in any of these two uncertainties 
(market or partner uncertainty) will lead to a higher possibility that the option partners 
implement an option clause in their initial contract.  
From a real options perspective, the resources of a firm create a bundle of options. These 
options, emerging from the specific capabilities and assets of a firm, enable future strategic 
decisions. (Bowman/ Hurry 1993) As the resources of the franchisee are unknown to the 
franchisor, the potential of a gain in value, emerging from the higher flexibility, rises.  
The implication for managers in negotiating franchising contracts is that an option to 
expand in the future promises to be more valuable, when uncertainty about the franchisee’s 
resources and capabilities seems to be high. Therefore the implementation of an option to 
acquire clause in the franchising contract stipulates the right to the option, and is more 
likely in conditions of high- perceived partner uncertainty.  
 
H2: The higher the perceived uncertainty about the franchisee’s capabilities and 
resources, the higher is the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. 
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5.4.2 Duration	  of	  the	  Franchising	  Arrangement	  
As demonstrated in Chapter 3.7.3.1, Option Value, one of the main principles in financial 
options theory is that, the longer the time to expiration of a call option, the higher its value. 
This basic premise of the options approach is derived from the Black- Scholes formula and 
is valid for European call options. In order to apply financial option theory to real options, 
research (Ziedonis 2007, Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009, Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 
2010) has considered this principle assumption.  
Aulakh, Jiang and Pan (2009) analysed in their study the effect of different types of 
uncertainty and the risk of competitive pre- emption on the duration of licensing 
agreements in the foreign market. Besides the recognition of a moderating effect of 
irreversibility on the relationship between uncertainty and the licensing duration, Aulakh, 
Jiang and Pan (2009) compile two hypotheses for different forms of uncertainty. The first 
hypothesis incorporates market uncertainty by assuming that a high level of market 
uncertainty results in a shorter duration of the licensing arrangement. The second 
hypothesis refers to technological uncertainty by also suggesting a negative relationship 
between the duration of a licensing agreement and the level of technological uncertainty. 
Surprisingly, the statistical results show differing findings, rejecting the first hypothesis, 
while supporting the second one.  
However, Cuypers and Martin (2010) state that, “The duration of an option determines its 
value insofar as longer time horizons provide more opportunities for the option to become 
in-the-money.“(Cuypers/ Martin 2010, p. 56). The longer duration of an option enables the 
resolution of uncertainty, through having the time to collect additional information and to 
learn. It is important to notice that Cuypers and Martin’s (2010) data for their study is 
based upon joint ventures (JVs) in China with an ex ante specified duration of the JV. The 
duration of the JV contract has to be fixed in the JV’s articles of association, as it is 
compulsory for JVs in China by law. In some franchising contracts, duration is as well 
specified ex ante. 
In the same context, Ziedonis (2007) mentions for licensing of university technologies that, 
“(…) the short time period of the option contract (…) limits the opportunity to use the 
option to resolve exogenous uncertainty (...)“(Ziednois 2007, p.1619). 
Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) state that the duration of a technological 
joint venture (TJV) represents the timespan available for developing the underlying 
technology. The longer this time horizon is, the more valuable is the TJV. (Estrada/ De la 
Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010) 
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Therefore a JV with an explicit option- to- acquire clause and no fixed duration of the JV 
can be seen as an American call option. In case of the right of pre-emption, fixed in the 
franchising contract, the duration of the franchise agreement is determined by the 
franchisee. The franchisee wants to sell the franchise and the franchisor holds the right to 
buy in advance to competitors. Hence the franchisor has no influence on the duration of the 
franchising agreement. In this sense the franchising agreement acts like a European call 
option. The value of a call option, as demonstrated in Figure 4, increases as the time to 
expiration rises. The franchisor holding an option clause gains more value and future 
opportunities, when the duration of the franchising agreement is higher. 
 
H3: The longer the duration of a franchising agreement, the higher is the likelihood 
of the usage of an option clause.  
5.4.3 Know-­‐How	  Transferability	  
For the next hypothesis concerning the degree of know- how transferability, not only real 
options arguments are used. As demonstrated in Chapter 4.3, “Combined Approaches in 
Research”, this method broadens the existing considerations of the managerial decision- 
making processes and the governance choice.  
The following considerations are based upon the assumption that know- how is perceived 
as a valuable resource, which generates a competitive advantage. Further know- how 
transferability is presumed to be an indicator for the intangibility of a system. The 
underlying assumption is that intangible assets, like know- how, are harder to transfer. The 
more intangible assets exist in a system, the higher is the know- how transferability. The 
higher the level of tacit know- how, the harder it is for the firms to absorb and exploit the 
knowledge of the partner. Concerning the level of know- how transferability leads analysis 
to a more firm specific level. The firm specific capabilities and resources to absorb know- 
how might influence the firms’ governance choices substantially.  
As Trigeorgis (1996) mentions “Sustainable competitive advantages (…) empower 
companies with valuable options to grow through future profitable investments and to 
more effectively respond to unexpected adversities or opportunities in a changing 
technological, competitive, or general business environment.”(Trigeorgis 1996, p.19). 
These competitive advantages are a result of the firm’s resources and capabilities.   
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) utilize a resource- based approach in order to explain the 
entry mode choice of manufacturing and service firms. Therefore a comparison of the 
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choice between a full control mode, such as a wholly owned subsidiary, and a shared entry 
mode of control, such as management contracts, licensing or joint ventures, is drawn. 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) hypothesize “A firm with a valuable tacit know-how that is 
a competitive advantage in a foreign market will use a full control mode to enter the 
market: the firm will adopt sole ownership as an entry mode.“(Ekeledo/ Sivakumar 2004, 
p.77). The statistical results do not support this hypothesis. Consequently, the choice of 
entry mode seems not to be significantly influenced by tacit know-how, according to the 
data used by Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004). 
Further Estrada, De la Fuente and Martín-Cruz (2010) confirm for technological joint 
ventures (TJVs) that “(...) The greater the firm’s absorptive capacity, the more likely the 
firm is to form a TJV.“(Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010), p.1189).  
The uncertainty is related negatively to the degree of know- how transferability. Folta, 
Johnson and O’Brien (2006), who investigated the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility 
of investment on the market entry mode decision, found that, “(…) the negative effect of 
UNCERTAINTY is more pronounced when considering entry into industries (...) requiring 
more investment in intangible assets.“(Folta/ Johnson/ O’Brien 2006, p. 445).  
The ability to learn during the option period from the partner in a collaborative venture 
makes the option to defer immediate investment more valuable. However, Ziedonis (2007) 
remarks that, “(…) firms that are better able to “absorb” the technology during the contract 
period may have reduced incentives to subsequently license the invention.“(Ziedonis 2007, 
p.1618). The easier it is to absorb the know-how, which means a higher degree of know- 
how transferability, the less the firm will be interested in acquiring the partner at the end. 
The hypothesis of Ziedonis (2007) in this matter is “(…) Firms better able to evaluate an 
invention will be less likely to purchase an option contract prior to making a licensing 
decision, all else equal.”(Ziedonis 2007, p.1620). The results show support for this 
hypothesis and indicated henceforth the firm specific impact on the options value via the 
firms’ capabilities to absorb know- how. Consequently Ziedonis (2007) highlights that 
“(…) firms in the sample that are better able to evaluate an external technology are less 
likely to purchase an option.”(Ziedonis 2007, p. 1618).  
The lower the know- how transferability, the greater the incentive to use an option clause 
in the franchising contract. On the one hand the option clause can be seen as a way to 
obtain more control, on the other hand the option- to- acquire seems to be more valuable as 
for instance tacit know- how is involved.  
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H4: The harder it is to transfer know-how (e.g.: tacit knowledge), the higher is the 
likelihood of the usage of an option clause. 
5.4.4 Sector	  of	  Operation	  
The sector of operation might as well influence the choice of market entry mode. 
Blomstermo, Sharma and Sallis (2006) investigate the entry mode choice of 140 Swedish 
service firms, by differing hard and soft- service firms. In opposition to hard- service firms, 
soft- service firms are defined by their inseparability of production and consumption. 
Blomstermo, Sharma and Sallis (2006) suggest for soft- service firms the use of a high 
control mode, when entering a foreign market, and find that “The statistical analysis shows 
that, in general, soft-service firms are much more likely than hard service firms to choose a 
high control entry mode over a low control entry mode.“(Blomstermo/ Sharma/ Sallis 
2006, p.211). 
Further Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2007) also distinguish between separable (hard) and non- 
separable (soft) service firms. By using a resource- based approach, firms of the service 
sector are compared in their entry mode choice, with manufacturing firms. One of  Ekeledo 
and Sivakumar’s (2007) hypothesis, which finds support in the statistical analysis is that, 
“Compared to manufacturing firms, a larger percentage of non-separable service firms 
enter foreign markets with a combination of FDI and a franchising entry mode.“(Ekeledo/ 
Sivakumar 2007, p.83). Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2007) found a significantly difference in 
the entry mode choice of manufacturing and service firms, which sources, in Ekeledo and 
Sivakumar’s (2007) opinion, in the simultaneity of consumption and production in case of 
soft services. 
Kogut (1991) showed for joint ventures a greater likelihood of acquisition in joint 
ventures, when research and development (R&D) activities or marketing and distribution is 
involved, than for production activities.  
Blomstermo, Sharma and Sallis (2006) state that, “(...) services are characterized by 
intangibility, and inseparability of production and consumption (...) (Blomstermo/ Sharma/ 
Sallis 2006, p.213). This intangibility leads to a higher degree of uncertainty, which results 
in more flexibility in managerial decision- making and henceforth a higher option value. 
The implementation of an option clause is therefore more valuable in case of service firms, 
due to the greater learning potential during the franchising agreement.  
H5: Firms operating in services have a greater likelihood of the usage of an option 
clause, than firms operating in production and distribution. 
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5.4.5 Control	  Variables	  
Beside the above- mentioned implications, other factors may influence the likelihood of 
the existence of an option clause in a franchising contract. Henceforth four variables are 
chosen, which could be tested, with data accessibly through the franchising questionnaire 
in Chapter 6, “Empirical Study”, empirical study. Those four variables are elaborateness of 
contractual agreement, experience of the franchisor, trust and coordination mechanisms. 
The Elaborateness of contractual agreement refers to the possibility that a contract, which 
in general is more detailed, might show a greater likelihood of the use of an option clause 
in the contract. The more explicit the contractual franchising agreement is generally, the 
higher the trend towards an option clause. 
The Experience of the franchisor can impact the occurrence of option clauses in 
franchising contracts in that way that the more experience the franchisor has, the more the 
contract might include option clauses. As the franchisor has more experience, the 
franchisor may have developed better contracting and negotiation skills via learning. 
(Leiblein 2003)  
On the other hand firms with a lot of experience with international joint ventures, have a 
lower interest in purchasing explicit options. Still, the contrary argument, which seems to 
be more attractive, is that firms with more experience have a greater ability to write more 
complete contracts and are better trained in negotiating. (Reuer/ Tong 2005) Hence the 
likelihood of an option clause might increase with the degree of experience of the 
franchisor.  
Further Trust could affect the usage of option clauses, namely “(…) higher trust might lead 
to the decision “(…) not to rely upon detailed contracts to ensure predictability.”(Leiblein 
2003, p.954). However the existence of trust may reduce the necessity of high commitment 
entry mode forms, such as joint ventures, and might forward the use of more flexible 
forms, such as contracts. (Estrada/ De la Fuente/ Martín-Cruz 2010) The impact of trust 
between the contracting partners should be examined more in detail in real options 
research.  
The practice of Coordination mechanisms in a franchising arrangement could influence the 
likelihood of an option clause in a negative way. Coordination mechanisms, for instance 
frequent meetings of the franchisor and the franchisee, can help to facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge; under the assumption that in face-to face meetings the exchange of know- how 
is easier. In this context Leiblein (2003) mentions that, “(…) the coordination mechanisms 
associated with various forms of organization mediate the relationship between exchange 
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characteristics and governance choice.”(Leiblein 2003, p.954). 
Those four variables should be tested, in order to identify their relationship in regard to the 
likelihood of an option clause in a franchising contract.  
5.4.6 Other	  variables	  in	  Research	  
In real options research attention has been drawn to some additional variables to the above 
mentioned. In this Chapter the variables, competitors, core versus non- core business, legal 
regimes, cultural distant partner, industry differences and irreversibility of investment are 
briefly mentioned.  
The number of Competitors in a market is analysed in order to explain the decision 
between forming joint ventures and outright acquisition and has been interconnected to the 
risk of pre-emption. (Kogut 1991, Folta 1998) Further the factor competition is used as a 
control variable, when investigating licensing under real options perspective. (Ziedonis 
2007) 
The question if a firm operates in its Core versus non-core business has a significant 
impact on the entry modes choice. Folta (1998) showed a greater likelihood of joint 
venture formation over acquisition, when the primary businesses of the partners differ. As 
businesses of the partners are dissimilar, greater amounts of uncertainty emerge and more 
potential for learning and increasing the knowledge base is gained. (Kogut 1991, Folta 
1998) However, for the usage of explicit call options in international joint ventures (IJVs) 
Reuer, Tong and Peng (2005) found “(…) that IJVs situated in a firm’s core business are 
more likely to use explicit call options, and those in other product markets, even ones 
somewhat similar to the core business, are less likely to use these contractual 
arrangements.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.418). Concerning licensing Ziedonis (2007) 
distinguishes between firms’ intentions when entering a business dissimilar to their core 
area of operations. The idea of exploitation and exploration plays an important role in this 
context. The hypothesis that “(…) Firms with a higher level of technological knowledge 
related to an invention will be more likely to license the invention, all else 
equal.”(Ziedonis 2007, p.1621), is supported by the data.  
Further considerations about the Legal regimes of a host country and its influence on the 
governance structure are conducted. The likelihood of an explicit option (option to acquire) 
in a (international) joint venture is assumed to be higher, when the host country provides a 
weaker intellectual property regime or legal regime. (Chi/ McGuire 1996, Reuer/ Tong 
2005) Although the argumentation of Chi and McGuire (1996), and Reuer and Tong 
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(2005) is mainly based upon transaction costs economics, the logic outcome can be viewed 
from a real options perspectives as well. The increasing uncertainty prevails the firms with 
valuable future opportunities. 
The more Cultural distant a partner is, the more likely the firm will use an explicit option 
in the contract. Reuer and Tong (2007) demonstrated that cultural distance is connected 
with a higher amount of downside risk. The possibility to respond to behavioural 
uncertainty is valuable and “(…) firms are more likely to use explicit call options in the 
culturally most distant countries.”(Reuer/ Tong 2005, p.418). 
The next variable refers to Industry differences. The underlying presumption of this 
variable is that emerging industries provide valuable growth options. The growth potential 
of technical subfields animates firms to form joint ventures instead of entering the industry 
with immediate acquisition. (Folta 1998) However studies exist (Reuer/ Tong 2005, Reuer/ 
Tong/ Peng 2006), which show results leaving concerns to the idea, that emerging 
economies confer valuable growth options. 
The Irreversibility of investment represents another factor with influence on the entry mode 
choice of the firm. Folta, Johnson and O’Brien (2006) demonstrated that irreversibility of 
investment has a significant positive impact in regard to the effect of uncertainty to market 
entry. Irreversibility of investment should be analysed in future real options research, as 
the interaction effect of irreversibility and uncertainty has been verified. (Folta/ Johnson/ 
O’Brien 2006) 
Due to the lack of data and the appropriate framework, the variables mentioned above, will 
not be taken into account in the statistical analysis of option clauses in franchising 
contracts in Chapter 6, “Empirical Study”. Still, it is of importance to keep those factors in 
mind, when trying to draw conclusions by means of the empirical results.  
5.4.7 Summary	  of	  Hypotheses	  and	  Control	  Variables	  
In order to provide a better overview, the five hypotheses for the usage of option clauses in 
franchising contracts are summarized below:  
H1: The higher the perceived environmental uncertainty, the higher is the likelihood of the 
usage of an option clause.  
H2: The higher the perceived uncertainty about the franchisee’s capabilities and resources, 
the higher is the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. 
H3: The longer the duration of a franchising agreement, the higher is the likelihood of the 
usage of an option clause.  
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H4: The harder it is to transfer know-how (e.g.: tacit knowledge), the higher is the 
likelihood of the usage of an option clause.  
H5: Firms operating in services have a greater likelihood of the usage of an option clause, 
than firms operating in production and distribution. 
 
The control variables utilized for the statistical analysis of the likelihood of option clauses 
in franchising contracts are: elaborateness of contractual agreement, experience of the 
franchisor, trust and coordination mechanisms. 
 
Figure 5: Model summary for empirical study, Angelika Brix. 
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6. Empirical	  Study	  
6.1 Problem	  Definition	  and	  Objectives	  
In the research project „Eigentumsstrategie von Franchise- Unternehmen in Deutschland“ 
conducted by ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Josef Windsperger a questionnaire has been given 
to German firms to analyse the factors influencing the choice of ownership strategy of the 
franchisor. As the data has been collected from the franchisors’, an analysis of the results 
has to be understood from the franchisors perspective. The questionnaire (see Chapter 12, 
“Appendix”) contents the question, “the franchisor has a contractual option to buy the 
franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-emption)”(“Der Franchisegeber hat 
vertragliche Optionsrechte bei Veräußerung des Franchisebetriebes durch den 
Franchisenehmer (z.B.: Vorkaufsrecht).”). This question could be answered by “yes” or 
“no”, which leads us to several possible research questions, why in some cases this option 
rights are contractually fixed and why in other cases they are not. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, “Franchising and the Real Options Approach”, several hypotheses emerge from 
theory. Those hypotheses should be tested empirically in the following, using the software 
for statistical testing SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) version 20.0. The aim 
of this analysis is to test whether the in Chapter 5.4, “Hypotheses”, conducted hypotheses 
can be approved with the available data.  
6.2 Methodology	  
In order to test the in the former derived hypotheses, it is essential to identify the questions 
(variables) in the questionnaire (see Chapter 12, “Appendix”), which are useful in respect 
to the hypotheses. With the aim of using the variables sensitive, it seems feasible to adapt 
some of the variables, after descriptive statistics were done. In the next step, a factor 
analysis is conducted, in order to cluster the variables after a reliability analysis. 
Afterwards, a logistic regression with the newly formed variables is calculated. As the 
dependent variable is binary, the use of a linear regression analysis would be inappropriate. 
The logistic regression analysis may reveal if the hypotheses can be corroborated.  
6.2.1 Description	  of	  Data	  and	  Collection	  
The data for the empirical study was compiled via a questionnaire (see Chapter 12, 
“Appendix”), which was answered by franchisors in Germany. The number of franchising 
firms, which answered the questionnaire, is 137. The questionnaire contains specific 
 65 
questions concerning the ownership strategy of the franchisor, the contractual agreement 
between the franchisor and the franchisee and general information about the franchisor’s 
firm.  
6.2.2 Measures	  
Most of the variables in the questionnaire are inquired via a seven point Likert scale, where 
“1” represents “not correct at all” and “7” means “fully correct”. Some answers had to be 
filled in by the participants, for instance “Average number of annual formal meetings 
between franchisor and franchisee” or “Contract length in years”. One question deals with 
the type of franchising, where the franchise is operating. This question had three 
possibilities to answer: product franchising, sales/distribution or services. The dependent 
variable “the franchisor has a contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the 
franchisee (i.e. pre-emption)”, has a nominal scale (“yes” or “no”) and is therefore 
dichotomous.  
6.2.2.1 Variables	  
Dependent variable: 
The dependent variable for the logistic regression analysis is “the franchisor has a 
contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-
emption)”(A014_07b).  
Independent variables: 
Perceived environmental uncertainty: 
H1: The higher the perceived environmental uncertainty, the higher is the likelihood of the 
usage of an option clause.  
The following three questions are supposed to provide data concerning the perceived 
environmental uncertainty:  
• The sales at the outlet level is very fluctuating (A013_02), 
• It is very difficult to predict the market development at the outlet level (A013_03), 
and 
• The economic environment in the local market is changing rapidly (A013_06). 
Behavioural uncertainty: 
H2: The higher the perceived uncertainty about the franchisee’s capabilities and resources, 
the higher is the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. 
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The variable, dealing with behavioural uncertainty, should be created with the following 
three questions: 
• It is very difficult to measure the performance of the outlet manager (franchisee or 
manager) (A013_01), 
• It is very difficult to control the behavior of the outlet manager (franchisees or 
managers) (A013_04), and 
• It is very difficult to assess the competencies and capabilities of the outlet manager 
(franchisee or manager) (A013_05).  
Duration of the franchise contract: 
H3: The longer the duration of a franchising agreement, the higher is the likelihood of the 
usage of an option clause.  
Therefore the question “Franchise contract length in years” will be analysed.  
Know- How transferability: 
H4: The harder it is to transfer know-how (e.g.: tacit knowledge), the higher is the 
likelihood of the usage of an option clause.  
For this hypothesis the variable “KNOW HOW” should be formed with eight questions: 
How difficult is it to transfer to franchisees   
• brand name,  
• marketing know-how,  
• organizational know-how, 
• administrative know how,  
• quality management know how,  
• accounting know how,  
• human resources know how, and 
• IT know-how.  
Type of franchise: 
H5: Firms operating in services have a greater likelihood of the usage of an option clause, 
than firms operating in production and distribution. 
The “Type of franchising” is essential for testing this hypothesis. Although three answers 
are possible for the question, namely, “Product franchising”, “Sales/Distribution” or 
“Service”, in Chapter 6.3.2, “Frequencies”, those three categories will be reduced to two 
categories. This is feasible not only with regard to content but also with regard to the 
available data.  
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6.2.2.2 Control Variables 
Detailed contract: 
“The contract specifies the tasks of the partners in great details”, measures how detailed a 
contract between the franchisor and the franchisee is, on a seven point Likert scale.  
Experience of the franchisor:  
The experience of the franchisor is captured by asking the “Year when first franchised 
outlet was opened in Germany/Swi/Aut”. This question gives an idea of the duration of 
operations in general of the franchisor. As the data collected gave only the date, when the 
first outlet was opened, the data had to be transformed into years. The assumption 
concerning the experience of the franchisor is that, the higher the variable “age” is, the 
more experience does the franchisor have.  
Trust: 
For the variable trust a factor analysis (Chapter 6.3.3, “Factor Analysis”) is conducted in 
order to test, if the following eight questions could be clustered to one variable:  
• The cooperation is based on partnership basis (A006_01), 
• The exchange of information between us and the partners goes beyond the agreed 
scope (A006_02), 
• There is great trust between ourselves and the partners (A006_07), 
• There is an atmosphere of openness and honesty between us and the partners 
(A006_08), 
• We trust the people with whom we have longterm relationship (A006_03), 
• The majority of people trust other (A006_04), 
• Most people are trustworthy (A006_05), and 
• Most people behave cooperatively if they are trusted (A006_06). 
Coordination mechanisms: 
In order to measure how strong coordination mechanisms are between the franchisor and 
the franchisee the following four questions are choosen: 
• Average number of annual formal meetings between franchisor and franchisee, 
• Average of number of franchisor's visits to franchisee, 
• Annual training - number of days franchisor will train franchisee, and 
• Annual training - number days franchisee's employees will be trained. 
The presumption is that, the higher the number of meetings and trainings, the greater the 
personal interaction between the partners and the stronger the coordination mechanisms.  
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6.3 Analysis of the Study 
6.3.1 Descriptive	  Statistics	  
As the number of various variables is with thirty very high, only the most important results 
are going to be presented in the following. Further the arguments, why some variables 
needed to be transformed are presented.  
6.3.2 Frequencies	  
6.3.2.1 Dependent	  Variable	  
137 franchising firms have answered the questionnaire. The question if the “the franchisor 
has a contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-
emption)” with the possibility to answer rather “yes” or “no”, was answered by 124 of the 
participants, while 13 values for this question were missing. Of the 124 answers, 40 
participants gave the answer “no” and 84 participants affirmed having an option clause in 
their franchising contract. In per cent, 90,5% of the franchising firms in the study answered 
the question, concerning the existence of an option clause. Of those who answered the 
question 32,3% stated “no” and 67,7% answered with “yes”. (see Figure 6) 
 
Figure 6: Frequencies, The franchisor has a contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the 
franchisee 
The dependent variable for the regression analysis of the data therefore is, whether a firm 
has an option clause in the franchising contract or not. Hence the variable “the franchisor 
has a contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-
emption)” represents a dichotomous variable, which has been coded for the logistic 
regression analysis with “0” = “No (option clause)” and “1” = “Yes (option clause exists in 
the contract)”.  
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6.3.2.2 Independent	  Variables	  
Duration of the franchise contract in years (B014_01b) 
Concerning the duration of the franchising agreement most of the 119 responses (18 values 
are missing), namely 47,1% answer 5 years. (see Figure 7) Further 30,3% of the 
franchisors state that their contract length is 10 years, which leads to the fact that most of 
the cases are concentrated at two values.  
This result is not surprising, when knowing that in franchising contract durations of 5 years 
are very common. (Adams/ Jones/ Hickey 1997, Blair/ Lafontaine 2005) 
 
 
Figure 7: Frequencies, Histogramm, Franchise contract length in years 
In order to mitigate logistic regression analysis, the variable “franchise contract length in 
years” (B014_01) is recoded into a variable (B014_01b), with the values “0”= short 
contract and “1”= long contract. A short contract in this context is defined by having a 
value for the years smaller than “9”, a long contract has a value bigger than “9”. (years < 
”9” – short contract ; years > “9” – long contract) As apparent below (see Table 2) 65,5% 
of the respondents have contracts with their franchisee up to 9 years length and 34,5 % 
have a duration of their contract above 9 years length.  
 
Table 2: Frequencies, Franchise contract length in years, coded. 
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“Sales/ Distribution” or “Service”. The 127 answers of the franchisors (10 missing values) 
showed 63,8% of the answers for “Service”, 33,1% for “Sales/ Distribution” and only 
3,1% for “Product franchising”. (see Figure 8) 
 
Figure 8: Frequencies, Type of franchising 
In respect to hypothesis 4 (H4), which refers to the type of franchising, and in order to 
alleviate statistical analysis, the variables “Sales/ Distribution” and “Product franchising” 
are united. (“1”= product franchising/ sales, distribution; “2”= service) The integration of 
“Product franchising” into “Sales/ Distribution” is feasible, also due to the fact that the 
value for “Product franchising” is very low. In Table 3 the frequencies for the new variable 
(B001b) show that of the 127 franchises, 36,2% are “Product franchising” or “Sales/ 
Distribution” and 63,8% belong to the type of “Service” franchising.  
 
 
Table 3: Frequencies, Product franchising /Sales Distribution and Services. 
6.3.2.3 Control	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Due to the fact that the participants of the questionnaire were asked when their first outlet 
was opened, the year dates needed to be transformed into years, in order to conduct a 
measure for the age of the firm. This value for the age of the firm, is further logarithmised 
in order to avoid skewness. (see Figure 9 and Figure 10) 
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Figure 9: Frequencies; Histogramm, Age of the franchise 
 
Figure 10: Frequencies, Histogramm, Age of the franchise, Ln 
  
Table 4: Frequencies, Comparison of "Age" and "Age" logarithmised. 
As demonstrated in Table 4 the logarithmised values, enhance the data in the direction of a 
normal distribution.  
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6.3.3 Factor	  Analysis	  
The aim of factor analysis is to identify factors, which underlie a bundle of variables in 
order to reduce complexity and enable an interpretation. Factor analysis can be helpful 
when aiming to find groups of clusters of variables.  
For some of the chosen questions, it is necessary to test whether those questions can be 
incorporated in new variables. Therefore a factor analysis is conducted. In respect to 
content, several questions are suspected to build a cluster. The variables in question are 
those, concerning perceived environmental uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty, know- 
how transferability, trust and coordination mechanisms. In order to test how many factors 
can be identified an exploratory factor analysis is done. The method of rotation for the 
principal component analysis is Varimax and the Kaiser’s criterion is used.  
The most important output for the factor analysis of the above-mentioned variables is as 
follows: 
 
Table 5: KMO- and Bartlett test, factor analysis for all relevant variables. 
The Kaiser- Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test shows a result of 0,73 and is therefore greater than 
the required 0,5. (see Table 5) Hence the value for a satisfactory factor analysis is met. The 
Bartlett test is highly significant (p< 0,001).  
 
 
Figure 11: Screeplot, factor analysis with all relevant variables, identification of seven components.  
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As the screeplot in Figure 11 shows, seven components are identified by SPSS 20.0, when 
applying Kaiser’s criterion. The Kaiser’s criterion counts a component as soon as the 
eigenvalue exceeds the value of 1. However Kaiser’s criterion sometimes overestimates 
the number of factors. In the screeplot in Figure 11 two points of inflexion can be 
recognized: the first one after three factors and the second one after six factors. For the 
following logistic regression (see Chapter 6.3.5, “Regression Analysis”) six components 
will build new variables.  
 
6.3.3.1 Uncertainty	  
Concerning uncertainty another factor analysis tests, whether perceived uncertainty, 
captured in the questionnaire, can be distinguished into environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty. When running a factor analysis with all six items, dealing with uncertainty, 
SPSS 20.0 reveals the following results: 
 
Table 6: KMO- Bartlett test, factor analysis for uncertainty. 
The Kaiser- Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test result (see Table 6) is 0,605 and therefore exceeds 
the required 0,5. Further, the Bartlett test is highly significant (p< 0,001). 
 
Table 7: Total Variance Explained, uncertainty. 
As Table 7 indicates, the first eigenvalue lies by 2,162. The corresponding factor therefore 
explains on average 36,028% of the variance of the variables. The percentage of explained 
variance for the last four factors reaches 14,658%. According to the Kaiser’s criterion, two 
factors can be extracted, as two eigenvalues exceed the value of 1. (2,162 and 1,877) 
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Figure 12: Screeplot, factor analysis for uncertainty, identification of two factors. 
The screeplot in Figure 12 demonstrates, that for the variable “uncertainty” two 
components can be recognized. Kaiser’s criterion as well as the point of inflexion (elbow) 
technique, lead to the identification of two components.  
 
Figure 13: Factor plot, Uncertainty, identification of two components. 
The Figure 13 shows the two components extracted from factor analysis. A013_03, 
A013_02 and A013_06, which refer to the variable PEUC (perceived environmental 
uncertainty), are concentrated around the x- axis. A031_01, A013_04 and A013_05 are 
situated around the y-axis and are, with regards to content, representing BUC (behavioural 
uncertainty).  
Further a reliability analysis confirms, that an affiliation of the six uncertainty variables is 
not sensitive.  
Faktor
654321
Ei
ge
nw
er
t
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
0,0
Screeplot
Seite 82
Komponente 1
1,00,50,0- 0 , 5- 1 , 0
Ko
m
po
ne
nt
e 
2
1,0
0,5
0,0
- 0 , 5
- 1 , 0
A013_05 A013_04
A013_01
A013_06
A013_03
A013_02
Komponentendiagramm im rotierten Raum
Reliabilität
     
  FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES A007_01 A007_ 2 A007_03 A007_04 A007_05 A007_06 A007_07 A007_08 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS A007_01 A007_02 A007_03 A007_04 A007_05 A007_06 A007_07 A007_08 
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /PLOT EIGEN ROTATION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /SAVE REG(ALL) 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
 
Seite 85
 75 
 
Table 8: Reliability analysis for uncertainty, Cronbachs Alpha. 
As Cronbachs Alpha (α) is below 0,65 it is rather not recommendable to subsume the six 
questions concerning uncertainty. The separation of those variables into perceived 
environmental uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty might be more adequate and is 
tested in the following. (see Table 8) 
 
6.3.3.1.1 Perceived	  environmental	  uncertainty	  
The three questions (The sales at the outlet level is very fluctuating, It is very difficult to 
predict the market development at the outlet level, The economic environment in the local 
market is changing rapidly) measuring perceived environmental uncertainty form one 
component.  
 
Table 9: Component matrix, perceived environmental uncertainty. 
In Table 9 the factor loading is demonstrated. The factor has a lower impact on the variable 
“The economic environment in the local market is changing rapidly”, than on the other two 
variables. 
 
Table 10: Reliability analysis, perceived environmental uncertainty. 
The reliability analysis for the three variables shows a Cronbachs Alpha (α) of 0,742. This 
value is acceptable, and therefore the new variable “perceived environmental uncertainty” 
(PUC) is formed and used in the later logistic regression. (see Table 10) 
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6.3.3.1.2 Behavioural	  Uncertainty	  
The second component of uncertainty is formed by the three questions, concerning 
behavioural uncertainty. (It is very difficult to measure the performance of the outlet 
manager (franchisee or manager), It is very difficult to control the behaviour of the outlet 
manager (franchisees or managers), It is very difficult to assess the competencies and 
capabilities of the outlet manager (franchisee or manager))  
 
Table 11: Total Variance Explained, behavioural uncertainty. 
The identification of one factor with the Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalue 1,931 > 1) is 
demonstrated in Table 11. This factor explains on average 64,356% of the variance of the 
variables. 
 
Table 12: Reliability analysis, Cronbachs Alpha, behavioural uncertainty. 
As reliability analysis calculates a Cronbachs Alpha (α) of 0,742 (see Table 12), the new 
variable “behavioural uncertainty” (BUC) is created.  
6.3.3.2 Know-­‐	  How	  
In order to subsume the eight questions, which deal with the know- how transferability 
between the franchising partners, another factor analysis and a reliability analysis is 
conducted. The aim of these analyses is to check whether an incorporation of those 
variables is possible.  
 
Table 13: KMO- Bartlett test, know- how. 
The Kaiser- Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test result is 0,877 and therefore reaches a great score 
(between 0,8 and 0,9). Additionally, the Bartlett test is highly significant (p< 0,001). (see 
Table 13) 
 
Erklärte Gesamtvarianz
Komponente
Anfängliche Eigenwerte
Gesamt Kumulierte % Gesamt Kumulierte %
1
2
3
1,931 64,356 64,356 1,931 64,356 64,356
,700 23,348 87,704
,369 12,296 100,000
Extraktionsmethode: Hauptkomponentenanalyse.
Komponentenmatrixa
Komponente
1
...
,836
,868
,692
a. 
a
a. 
     
  RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=A013_02 A013_03 A013_06 
  /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA.
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Table 14: Total Variance Explained, know- how. 
 
Figure 14: Screeplot, know- how, identification of one factor. 
In Figure 14 the identification of one factor for the variable KNOW- HOW is 
demonstrated. The eigenvalue of 5,061, with the corresponding factor explaining 63,264% 
of the variance of the variables is shown in Table 14.  
 
Table 15: Reliability analysis, Cronbachs Alpha, know- how. 
According to reliability analysis the Cronbachs Alpha (α) for the variable KNOW- HOW 
is 0,913, which is an excellent value for the eight items. (see Table 15) Consequently the 
variable KNOW- HOW is conducted and utilised in the logistic regression.  
 
6.3.4 Control	  Variables	  
The control variables, concerning “trust” and “coordination mechanisms” are also analysed 
with the aim to subsume the questions.  
Kommunalitäten
Anfänglich Extraktion
-- marketing know-how
-- IT know-how
1,000 ,283
1,000 ,647
1,000 ,778
1,000 ,779
1,000 ,661
1,000 ,701
1,000 ,642
1,000 ,571
Extraktionsmethode: Hauptkomponentenanalyse.
Erklärte Gesamtvarianz
Komponente
Anfängliche Eigenwerte
Gesamt Kumulierte % Gesamt Kumulierte %
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
5,061 63,264 63,264 5,061 63,264 63,264
,841 10,515 73,778
,558 6,971 80,750
,527 6,589 87,339
,417 5,216 92,555
,255 3,188 95,743
,221 2,764 98,506
,119 1,494 100,000
Extraktionsmethode: Hauptkomponentenanalyse.
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6.3.4.1 Trust	  
For the variable trust, the factor anaylsis reveals two components. The measure for trust 
between the franchisor and the franchisee contains eight questions (see Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16: Rotated Component Matrix, trust, identification of two components. 
Viewing the rotated component matrix (see Table 16) the first two and the last two 
variables (A006_01,02,07,08) load strongly on the first factor. Accordingly the variables 
(A006_03,04,05,06) can be summarised in the second factor. 
 
 
Figure 15: Factor plot, trust, identification of two components. 
Rotierte Komponentenmatrixa
Komponente
1 2
,844 ,083
,746 ,079
- ,002 ,545
- ,024 ,837
,044 ,875
,177 ,759
,908 ,007
,919 ,014
a. 
Komponente 1 2
1
2
,927 ,375
- ,375 ,927
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As Figure 15 exhibits, two components can be identified, when analysing all eight trust-
variables.   
 
Table 17: Reliability analysis, Cronbachs Alpha, trust. 
The reliability analysis of all eight trust- variables indicates a Cronbachs Alpha (α) of 
0,737. (see Table 17) The value of Cronbachs Alpha (α) improves as the trust- variables 
are distinguished into two new variables, namely “trust 1,2,7,8” and “trust 3,4,5,6”. For 
both of the new variables, Cronbachs Alpha (α) amounts to 0,876 (see Table 18). 
 
Table 18: Reliability analysis, Cronbachs Alpha, trust 1,2,7,8 and trust 3,4,5,6. 
 
Table 19: Component matrix, trust 1,2,7,8.                        Table 20: Component matrix, trust 3,4,5,6. 
In Table 19 and Table 20 the factor loadings of the two newly conducted variables for trust 
are indicated. The first variable “trust 1,2,7,8” has high factor loadings for all questions. 
The main focus in the four questions is set on the trust between the franchisor and its 
partners. The variable “trust 3,4,5,6” shows for the question “We trust the people with 
whom we have a long-term relationship” a lower factor loading than the other three 
questions. The questions of variable “trust 3,4,5,6” concern the general believes about 
trusting people. Both variables are going to act as control variables in the logistic 
regression.  
6.3.4.2 Coordination	  mechanisms	  
Another control variable incorporated into logistic regression deals with coordination 
mechanisms. The four questions, concerning the number of meetings and annual trainings, 
can form one variable, due to the results of factor analysis (see Table 21).  
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Table 21: Component matrix, coordination mechanisms. 
After a reliability analysis (see Table 22), which shows a Cronbachs Alpha (α) of 0,727, 
the four questions are subsumed to the variable “COORMECH”.  
 
Table 22: Reliability analysis, Cronbachs Alpha, coordination mechanisms.  
When COORMECH was conducted, the problem of the existence of outliers emerged.  
 
Figure 16: Histogramm, COORMECH.                  Figure 17: Histogramm, COORMECH without outliers. 
In order to eliminate the outliers, some values were changed to missing values. Three 
outliers showed extremely high values. For instance, one respondent (case 76) stated an 
average number of annual formal meetings between the franchisor and the franchisee of 
80. In case of annual trainings the answer scored 100. (see Figure 16 and Figure 17) 
Kommunalitäten
Anfänglich Extraktion
1,000 ,501
1,000 ,561
1,000 ,717
1,000 ,527
Extraktionsmethode: Hauptkomponentenanalyse.
Erklärte Gesamtvarianz
Komponente
Anfängliche Eigenwerte
Gesamt Kumulierte % Gesamt Kumulierte %
1
2
3
4
2,307 57,669 57,669 2,307 57,669 57,669
,886 22,153 79,822
,547 13,668 93,490
,260 6,510 100,000
Extraktionsmethode: Hauptkomponentenanalyse.
Komponentenmatrixa
Komponente
1
,708
,749
,847
,726
a. 
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Table 23: Statistics, comparison of COORMECH with and without outliers. 
After the elimination of outliers, by replacing missing values, the variance of the variable 
COORMECH changed from 28,489 to 12,384. The standard deviation is reduced from 
5,33753 to 3,75. (see Table 23) 
 
In summary the independent variables emerging from factor analysis are Perceived 
environmental uncertainty (PEUC), Behavioural uncertainty (BUC), Know-how 
transferability (KNOW HOW). The control variables conducted after factor analysis are 
Trust in partners (TRUST 1,2,7,8) and Trust in people in general (TRUST 3,4,5,6) and 
Coordination mechanisms (COORMECH).  
Furthermore the variables for calculating the logistic regression are the franchisor has a 
contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the franchisee (A014_07b), 
Duration of the franchise contract in years (B014_01b), Type of franchising (B001b), The 
contract specifies the tasks of the partners in great details (DETAIL), and Year when first 
franchised outlets was opened (AGE ln). The statistics for the five independent variables 
and the five control variables can be read in Table 24 and Table 25. 
 
 
Table 24: Statistics, variables for logistic regression. 
Anmerkungen
Ausgabe erstellt
Kommentare
Eingabe Daten
Aktiver Datensatz
Filter
Gewichtung
Aufgeteilte Datei
Verwendete Fälle
Syntax
Ressourcen Prozessorzeit
Verstrichene Zeit
02-JUN-2012 10:09:24
DatenSet1
<keine>
<keine>
<keine>
137
00:00:01,32
00:00:01,00
[DatenSet1] /Users/Angelika/Downloads/data.sav
Statistiken
N Gültig
Fehlend
Mittelwert
Median
Standardabweichung
Varianz
130 129
7 8
5,0558 4,6221
3,8125 3,7500
5,33753 3,51902
28,489 12,384
Seite 2
     
  FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=PEUC BUC B01 _01b KnowHow B001b 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE MEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Häufigkeiten
Anmerkungen
Ausgabe erstellt
Kommentare
Eingabe Daten
Aktiver Datensatz
Filter
Gewichtung
Aufgeteilte Datei
Verwendete Fälle
Syntax
Ressourcen Prozessorzeit
Verstrichene Zeit
02-JUN-2012 11:55:06
DatenSet1
<keine>
<keine>
<keine>
137
00:00:01,41
00:00:02,00
[DatenSet1] /Users/Angelika/Downloads/data.sav
Statistiken
PEUC BUC KNOW HOW
N Gültig
Fehlend
Mittelwert
Median
Standardabweichung
Varianz
127 127 119 137 127
1 0 1 0 1 8 0 1 0
3,7323 3,6273 ,34 3,5796 1,64
3,6667 3,6667 ,00 3,5000 2,00
1,35956 1,24836 ,477 1,30069 ,483
1,848 1,558 ,228 1,692 ,233
Häufigkeitstabelle
Seite 1
 82 
 
Table 25: Statistics, variables for logistic regression. 
In order to get a better overview of the above- mentioned variables and the corresponding 
hypotheses Table 26 provides a short summary. 
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The sales at the outlet level is very fluctuating
H
1
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ehavioural uncertainty
B
U
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Trust
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U
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The cooperation is based on partnership basis
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ation betw
een us and the partners goes beyond the agreed scope
There is great trust betw
een ourselves and the partners
There is an atm
osphere of openness and honesty betw
een us and the partners
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U
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ith w
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e have longterm
 relationship
The m
ajority of people trust other
M
ost people are trustw
orthy
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C
oordination m
echanism
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C
O
O
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M
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ber of annual form
al m
eetings betw
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ber of franchisor's visits to franchisee
A
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ber of days franchisor w
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A
nnual training -num
ber days franchisee's em
ployees w
ill be trained
Table 26: List and description of variables for logistic regression 
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6.3.5 Regression	  Analysis	  
A logistic regression has been conducted for the dependent variable,  “the franchisor has a 
contractual option to buy the franchise operation sold by the franchisee (i.e. pre-emption)” 
(“Der Franchisegeber hat vertragliche Optionsrechte bei Veräußerung des 
Franchisebetriebes durch den Franchisenehmer (z.B.: Vorkaufsrecht).”), and the variables 
in Table 26. The logistic regression is calculated with the method “enter”. This means that 
all covariates are included in the regression in one block and that parameter estimates are 
created for each block. A logistic regression analysis is feasible, as the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. 
Output of the logistic regression: 
 
Table 27: Summary of cases in the logistic regression. 
The number of cases included in the analysis is 82 out of 137, which equals 59,9%. (see 
Table 27) 
 
Table 28: Dependent variable encoding, logistic regression. 
Table 28 shows the coding for the dependent variable with 0=”No” and 1=”Yes”. 
 
In the following, “Block 0” or the “Beginning Block” is presented: 
 
Table 29: Classification Table, logistic regression. 
According to Table 29 the number of accepted cases is 82. Without knowledge of the 
estimated regression coefficient all of the respondents would be assigned to the bigger 
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Klassifizierungstabellea,b
Beobachtet
Vorhergesagt
No Yes
Schritt 0 No
Yes
Gesamtprozentsatz
0 2 3 ,0
0 5 9 100,0
72,0
a. 
b. 
Variablen in der Gleichung
Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Schritt 0 Konstante ,942 ,246 14,686 1 ,000 2,565
Variablen nicht in der Gleichung
Wert df Sig.
Schritt 0 Variablen PEUC
BUC
B014_01b
KnowHow
B001b
A010_05
B005_01c
trust1
trust2
COORMECH
Gesamtstatistik
7,876 1 ,005
,002 1 ,962
3,991 1 ,046
1,706 1 ,191
,006 1 ,940
,371 1 ,543
1,886 1 ,170
,319 1 ,572
3,743 1 ,053
3,200 1 ,074
15,739 1 0 ,107
Block 1: Methode = Einschluß
Omnibus-Tests der Modellkoeffizienten
Chi-Quadrat df Sig.
Schritt 1 Schritt
Block
Modell
18,642 1 0 ,045
18,642 1 0 ,045
18,642 1 0 ,045
Modellzusammenfassung
Schritt
1 78,678a ,203 ,293
a. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow-Test
Schritt Chi-Quadrat df Sig.
1 7,500 8 ,484
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group (59). Further 72% of cases are classified correctly. The results from Block 1 show an 
improvement of this value to 73,2% (see Table 36).  
 
Table 30: Variables in the equation, logistic regression. 
The odds ratio of the dependent variable is 59/23= 2,565 for the total sample. (see Table 
30) In Table 30 the model is demonstrated, when containing only the constant, without any 
predictors. The regression coefficient B gives the logarithmised odds ratio, 0,942.  
 
Table 31: Variables not in the equation, logistic regression. 
Table 31 shows the situation before adding the independent variables to the model.  
 
In the next part, „Block 1“ is analysed. The method for the logistic regression is „Enter“.  
 
Table 32: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients, logistic regression. 
The difference in the information explained in the model, compared to Block 0, is 
significant with 0,045 (p<0,05). The value of chi-square (χ!) is 18,642 
(>    χ!(0,95;10)=18,31). The degrees of freedom (df) show the number of parameters in the 
model. (see Table 32) 
 
Table 33: Model summary, logistic regression. 
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The Nagelkerkes R- square is demonstrated in Table 33 and has a value of 0,293. Hence 
the explained variance is 29,3%. The -2 Log Likelihood amounts 78,678 and the Cox & 
Snell R square 0,203. (see Table 33) 
 
Table 34: Hosmer and Lemeshow test, logistic regression. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test checks if the predicted values of the model differ 
significantly from the observed data. Therefore it is desirable to get a result, which is not 
significant (p>0,05). As the results in Table 34 indicate a significance of 0,484 (>0,05) the 
model seems to predict the data well.   
 
Table 35: Contingency table for Hosmer Lemeshow test, logistic regression. 
Table 35 presents the ten steps of the Hosmer Lemshow test with the observed and 
predicted frequencies.  
 
Table 36: Classification table, logistic regression. 
Regarding Table 36 it is obvious that the groups are not equally distributed (23 versus 59). 
In this regression model 73,2 % (60 of 82 cases) of the franchisors holding an option 
contract were classified in the right group. As above- mentioned, the model of Block 0 had 
72% of the cases classified correctly, which demonstrates an improvement in Block 1. 
However, the results for franchisors of not holding a contractual option are not very good. 
Only 30,4% of the cases are predicted correctly.  
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Kontingenztabelle für Hosmer-Lemeshow-Test
GesamtBeobachtet Erwartet Beobachtet Erwartet
Schritt 1 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
6 5,660 2 2,340 8
3 4,321 5 3,679 8
5 3,491 3 4,509 8
4 2,732 4 5,268 8
1 2,107 7 5,893 8
1 1,614 7 6,386 8
0 1,176 8 6,824 8
2 ,930 6 7,070 8
1 ,609 7 7,391 8
0 ,361 1 0 9,639 1 0
Klassifizierungstabellea
Beobachtet
Vorhergesagt
No Yes
Schritt 1 No
Yes
Gesamtprozentsatz
7 1 6 30,4
6 5 3 89,8
73,2
a. 
Variablen in der Gleichung
Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Schritt 1a PEUC
BUC
B014_01b
KnowHow
B001b
A010_05
B005_01c
trust1
trust2
COORMECH
Konstante
- ,518 ,241 4,607 1 ,032 ,596
- ,026 ,264 ,010 1 ,921 ,974
,926 ,740 1,565 1 ,211 2,524
,343 ,248 1,923 1 ,166 1,410
,112 ,617 ,033 1 ,856 1,118
- ,033 ,241 ,018 1 ,892 ,968
- ,491 ,295 2,761 1 ,097 ,612
- ,499 ,328 2,317 1 ,128 ,607
- ,205 ,303 ,460 1 ,498 ,814
,057 ,098 ,334 1 ,564 1,058
6,235 3,439 3,288 1 ,070 510,479
a. 
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Table 37: Variables in the equation, logistic regression. 
In Table 37 the regression coefficient B, the Wald statistics and the Exp (B) is 
summarized. This output shows the estimates for the coefficients for the predictors in the 
model. The Wald statistics, with a chi- square distribution, tests if the b- coefficient of one 
predictor is significantly different from zero. Exp (B) represents the odds ratio of each 
coefficient. Hence Exp (B) shows the change in odds, caused by a one- unit change in the 
predictor. The odds are defined as the probability of an event happening divided by the 
probability of that event not happening. The Exp (B) is the proportional change in odds. 
Therefore the interpretation of the Exp (B) is as follows: a value bigger than 1 indicates, 
that an increase in the predictor will increase the odds of the outcome happening. Hence a 
value smaller than 1 will decrease the odds, when the predictor increases. The only 
variable tested that results to be significant (p<0,05) is PEUC (perceived environmental 
uncertainty) with a value of 0,032. The Wald statistics for PEUC rises to 4,607. As the 
respondents change their answers by one unit on the seven point Likert scale, the 
probability ratio of the odds decreases by the factor 0,596. This negative relationship 
between the PEUC and the probability of the occurrence of an option clause in a 
franchising contract stays in contrast to hypothesis 1 (H1). In H1 the increase in PEUC was 
predicted to increase the likelihood of the usage of an option clause in a franchising 
contract. Consequently H1 is not confirmed, as the influence of PEUC on the possibility of 
the occurrence of an option clause is negatively related. The increase in one unit in PEUC 
nearly halves the odds of an option clause. The chance of having an option clause in a 
franchising contract decreases by 40,4% (1- Exp (B)) as PEUC increases by one unit. This 
result is surprising, as it reveals doubt to the real options argument, that higher uncertainty 
would lead to more investment via real options in order to maximise future opportunities.  
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The other variables miss the significance level (p<0,05). The variable B005_01c 
(experience of the franchisor) is the one exceeding the significance level at fewest, with a 
value of 0,097. The least significance is reported for the variable BUC (perceived 
behavioural uncertainty), with a value of 0,921. Hence the hypotheses 2-5 (H2- H5) show 
no significant result in the model.  
Therefore the considerations, emerging from theory, can not be supported for franchising 
with the available data. Only H1 shows a significant influence on the dependent variable. 
Conversely to the theoretical predictions, a negative relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the likelihood of the occurrence of an option clause in a 
franchising contract is found.   
 
 
Table 38: Collinearity matrix, logistic regression.  
In order to check for multicollinearity a collinearity matrix has been conducted. As all of 
the values in Table 38 are smaller than 0,8, the problem of multicollinearity is excluded.  
 
Table 39: Case summary, residuals, logistic regression. 
Table 39 shows the summary of the residuals of the logistic regression. Three cases were 
predicted to have an option clause in their contracts, but turn out to be wrongly classified. 
For instance case 60 was predicted to have an option clause in the contract (Y) with the 
probability 0,879. However, as the case was not right classified the residuals show a value 
of -0,879 (0- 0,879).  
 
         I                  Y      NN   N  N N   Y Y NY      NY  NNN Y N NY N  YN  NYYNY YYY
YYYYYNYNYYNYYYYY YI
         I                  Y      NN   N  N N   Y Y NY      NY  NNN Y N NY N  YN  NYYNY YYY
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6.3.6 Concluding	  Remarks	  
The results of the logistic regression lend support to the real options argument that 
perceived environmental uncertainty influences the decision of managers to implement 
explicit option clauses in the franchising contract. However the increase in the perception 
of environmental uncertainty does not lead to a rise in the likelihood of the existence of 
explicit option clauses in a franchising agreement. Conversely, the increase in perceived 
environmental uncertainty minders the probability of the existence of an option clause. The 
other tested variables, concerning the perceived behavioural uncertainty, the duration of 
the franchise contract, the know- how transferability and the type of franchising show no 
significant results. Also the control variables, dealing with the elaborateness of the 
contractual agreement, the experience of the franchisor, trust and coordination mechanisms 
are not significant. Reasons for these insignificant results may be the problematic of 
applying real options considerations for joint ventures and licensing to franchising, the 
available dataset and sample size or the difficulty of measuring uncertainty.  
Interestingly, Folta and Miller (2002) found for buyouts in equity partnerships, that a high 
level of uncertainty decreases the likelihood of a buyout. Folta and Miller’s (2002) 
underlying argument is that the resolution of uncertainty fosters decisions concerning 
commitment. The hypothesis of Folta and Miller (2002) assumes that the incentive to 
invest irreversible is rather low under conditions of high uncertainty. As there are less 
growth options under low levels of uncertainty, partner buyouts are more common.  
For franchising the statistical analysis of the available data reveal as well a negative 
relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an option clause. Higher perceived environmental uncertainty seems to 
decrease the incentive of fixing the right of pre- emption in an option clause in the 
franchising contract. However it is important to note that the introduced study is based 
upon data, which is limited in terms of sample size and geographical area (Germany). 
Further future research should also investigate the question if the existence of an explicit 
option clause in franchising agreements influences the perception of managers towards 
uncertainty.   
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7. Discussion	  of	  Results	  
Although the results of the statistical analysis reveal the significant influence of perceived 
environmental uncertainty (PEUC) on the likelihood of the occurrence of an explicit option 
clause in the franchising contract, the direction of this relation differs from the projected 
direction in hypothesis 1 (H1). H1: The higher the perceived environmental uncertainty, 
the higher is the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. The assumed positive 
relationship between PEUC and the likelihood of the usage of an option clause could not 
be approved with the available data. Conversely, the logistic regression analysis showed a 
negative relationship between those two variables. Therefore an increase of PEUC leads to 
a decrease in the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. In case of hypothesis 2 (H2: 
The higher the perceived uncertainty about the franchisee’s capabilities and resources, the 
higher is the likelihood of the usage of an option clause.), which deals with the behavioural 
uncertainty (BUC), the analysis of the available data shows no significant result. One 
major problem, when drawing analogies from real options research in joint ventures and 
licensing towards franchising, is the divergence in defining uncertainty in the different 
studies. The distinction between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty (see Folta 1998, 
Cuypers/ Martin 2010) seems feasible, however, the uncertainties analysed in this thesis do 
not coincide exactly with those definitions. For instance, the questionnaire (see Chapter 12, 
“Appendix”) deals with the franchisors’ perspective of external uncertainties and not with 
the subjective analysis of exogenous uncertainties. A mathematical framework would be 
required in order to investigate the effects of exogenous uncertainties on the likelihood of 
the occurrence of an option clause. Especially BUC may be rather categorized as a form of 
endogenous uncertainty. Cuypers and Martin (2010) already stated that the use of real 
options logic might be inappropriate, when a firm is confronted with endogenous 
uncertainty. Cuypers and Martin (2010) argue, that the underlying assumptions of real 
options theory, sourcing in financial options theory, do not include the idea that the firm 
itself can resolve uncertainty. In financial option theory, the possibility of the firm to make 
investments, negotiate and create future opportunities is not taken into account. Therefore 
an analysis of the impact of exogenous uncertainties on the occurrence of an option clause 
in franchising contracts should be a task for future research, as the data for the empirical 
study (see Chapter 12, ”Appendix”) is rather concerned with firm specific uncertainties.  
The third hypothesis (H3: The longer the duration of a franchising agreement, the higher is 
the likelihood of the usage of an option clause.) could not be supported by the results. The 
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presumption of H3, that longer time horizons lead to more valuable options sources in 
financial options theory. In this context, franchising was assumed in the thesis to represent 
a sequential form of market entry and was proclaimed to act like a European call option. 
However for franchising, in opposition to joint ventures or licensing, the bargaining power 
during the negotiation process is disposed uneven. As the data of the empirical study 
reveals, most of the franchising contracts are fixed up to five or ten years. Although the 
franchisee has the right to decide at which point in time the disposal of the franchise 
should take place, the franchisor has ex ante the bargaining power to decide about the 
duration of the agreement. Further the decision to implement an option clause (e.g. with 
the right of pre-emption) in the franchising contract can be assumed to be initiated rather 
through the franchisor than the franchisee. Hence the ex ante fixed duration of franchising 
contracts, as well as the greater bargaining power of the franchisor might be reasons for the 
non- affirmation of H3.  
Concerning the transfer of know-how hypothesis 4 (H4) predicted that a low level of 
know-how transferability should increase the likelihood of the usage of an option clause. 
The problem of this hypothesis is, that the argumentation towards know-how as a driving 
factor for the option clause occurrence is mostly based in resource based view (RBV). 
Following real options logic, a low level of know-how transferability embodies a higher 
degree of uncertainty, which should enable a greater chance for learning and should offer 
future opportunities to the firm. However, in practice, real options logic seems to ignore 
one essential factor for firms, which are using their know-how as a major instrument to 
gain a competitive advantage: control. Basically the same problem occurs when hypothesis 
5 (H5) is not confirmed. H5: Firms operating in services have a greater likelihood of the 
usage of an option clause, than firms operating in production and distribution. The 
intangibility in respect to service firms, another RBV argument, leads to the above-
mentioned desire of the firm to obtain control. At this point real options theory is reaching 
its limits and it is feasible to combine the real options approach with other theoretical 
frameworks (e.g. transaction costs economics, RBV) in order to better understand the 
incentives of franchising firms to implement explicit option clauses in their contracts.   
Besides the combination of approaches, a broader set of data on international franchising 
companies might help to test the most basic real options assumptions. Although the real 
options approach seems to be promising in regard to understand strategic decision making 
processes, the crucial role of control should not be forgotten. Therefore an extension of the 
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real options theory towards an analysis of different uncertainties and the reactions of 
managers, when confronted with those uncertainties, is recommendable. 
8. Conclusion	  
In summary, the main principles of financial and real options theory were presented, the 
application of the basic real option concepts in alliances (joint ventures, licensing) was 
demonstrated and the theoretical attempt to use real options approach in franchising was 
conducted. Further the, from theory, derived hypotheses were statistically tested with a 
dataset using a questionnaire, answered by German franchising firms.  
The aim of this thesis was to identify factors, which influence the likelihood of the usage 
of an option clause in a franchising contract. The main prediction of real options approach 
is the relevant influence of uncertainty on the managerial decision making process and on 
strategic investment decisions. The idea, that real options can be useful instruments in 
order to minimize downside risk of investments, while maximizing upside opportunities, 
offers new perspectives of considering problems, such as entry mode decisions, investment 
strategies and project’s valuation. Although research investigated the application of the 
real options approach in the field of joint ventures (Kogut 1991, Chi/ McGuire 1996, Folta 
1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, etc.) and licensing (Aulakh/ Jiang/ Pan 2009, etc.), the extension 
towards franchising is new. In order to create testable hypotheses, analogies were drawn 
from real options considerations in alliances to franchising. Therefore franchising was 
assumed to represent a sequential form of market entry, with the aim of deferring 
immediate investment, hence a real option to defer. Further franchising can be seen as an 
option to expand, learn and grow. Beside the need to investigate the presumption, that 
franchising can be perceived as a real option, this thesis focused on the explicit option 
clauses in franchising contracts. Therefore the option clause is the legally binding 
implementation of a real option. The existence of an explicit option clause in the 
franchising contract has been investigated from the franchisors perspective. The only 
factor with a significant influence on the likelihood of the usage of an option clause was 
the perceived environmental uncertainty. Surprisingly a negative relationship between 
perceived environmental uncertainty and the occurrence of an option clause is indicated by 
the available data.  
However, the real options approach could help to understand decision- making processes 
and managerial strategic considerations under uncertainty. The arising flexibility can add 
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value to the firm, as the exploitation of future opportunities is facilitated through the 
possibility of gaining new information.   
 
8.1 Future	  Research	  Perspectives	  
Due to the fact, that the application of real options theory to franchising is considerably 
new, a lot of future research questions emerge. As this thesis represents an attempt in order 
to combine real options logic and franchising, a major research desideratum on this field 
remains.  
The importance of approving the most basic real options principles in regard to franchising 
is pre-eminent. Therefore it would be necessary to test whether franchising can be seen as 
a real option. Further the question if a franchise agreement creates growth options should 
be tested, by generating new mathematical frameworks. Besides the mathematical 
examination of this problem, qualitative research should give an insight of the managers’ 
incentives, when considering franchising as an entry mode. The question, if managers 
perceive franchising as a real option, would help to investigate the active utilisation of real 
options approach in management. In addition to the managers’ perception, the 
organisational implications for choosing real options projects to invest should be studied.  
Another important issue in respect to the general assumption emerging from real options 
theory, is the idea, that real options add value to the firm. Reuer, Tong and Peng (2006) 
tested for IJVs, if those IJVs provide valuable growth options. Analysis of the valuation of 
a franchise agreement using real options theory is recommendable, before dealing with the 
question if the franchise agreement, as a real option, adds value to the firm. In more detail 
tests would be required to investigate whether option clauses in franchising contracts 
procure additional value, as presumed by real options theory. In case of an option to 
acquire clause, the evaluation if the value of an acquisition is influenced by the existence 
of an explicit option clause should be tested.  
Future research should focus as well on the franchisee. The intentions, advantages and 
disadvantages of the franchisee for signing a contract with an option clause would be of 
interest. As this thesis deals with basic considerations of real options principles only from 
the franchisor’s perspective an extension to the franchisee- side (put option) is essential. 
Consequently the combined franchisor- franchisee motives in writing franchising contracts 
should be examined following a real options approach. Research findings concerning the 
franchisors’ and franchisees’ motives could give a hint to an additional issue. The reasons, 
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why firms opt for selling call or put options ex ante, with an explicit option clause in the 
franchising contract, rather than negotiating conditions ex post. For understanding such a 
problem, a connection in research of the practice of explicit call options in franchising 
contracts and the general view of franchising as a real option would be advantageous.  
Moreover, the comparison of different market entry modes as real options (joint ventures, 
licensing, franchising, etc.) or an investigation of the different use of option clauses in 
those entry modes can be a task for future researchers.  
Although real options approach seems to be promising in explaining problems of 
managerial decision making, real options theory should not be apprehended as a self- 
sufficient tool. The combination of real options approach and existing theories, such as 
transaction costs (TC) economics, or the resource- based view (RBV) is more feasible and 
creates an extensive framework for future development opportunities. 
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12. Appendix	  
 
Alle erhobenen Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur in aggregierter Form verwendet. Anhand des 
Datenmaterials können keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Unternehmen gezogen werden. 
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EIGENTUMSSTRATEGIE VON FRANCHISE-UNTERNEHMEN IN 
DEUTSCHLAND 
 
UNIV. PROF. DR. JOSEF WINDSPERGER 
(PROJEKTMITARBEITERIN: LINDIA-MARIA MORITZ)  
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSZENTRUM 
UNIVERSITÄT WIEN 
BRÜNNERSTR. 72, A–1210 WIEN 
TEL. 0043-1-4277-38180; FAX: 0043-1-4277-38174 
Email: josef.windsperger@univie.ac.at 
Unterstützt vom 
Deutschen Franchise-Verband (DFV) 
(Geschäftsführer: Torben Leif Brodersen) 
Firmenname und Adresse: (optional!) 
 
 
Tel. Nr.  
E-Mail:  
Ziel des Fragebogens ist es, die Einflussfaktoren bei der Wahl der Eigentumsstrategie von 
Franchiseunternehmen aus der Sicht des Franchisegebers zu untersuchen.  
 
Grundsätzlich sind nach Möglichkeit alle gestellten Fragen zu beantworten. Sollten Sie auf eine Frage 
keine Antwort wissen, so versuchen Sie bitte die bestmögliche Antwort zu finden. Sie finden den 
Fragebogen auch unter folgendem Link: http://im.univie.ac.at/Windsperger/news/?no_cache=1. Ferner 
können Sie auch eine Online-Version ausfüllen: https://www.soscisurvey.de/muf2010/ 
(Passwort: umfrage2010). Für etwaige Probleme beim Ausfüllen des Fragebogens stehe ich Ihnen gerne 
persönlich zur Verfügung (Email: josef.windsperger@univie.ac.at oder 00431427738180).  
 Ich möchte mich für Ihre freundliche Unterstützung schon im Voraus recht herzlich bedanken. 
Die Untersuchungsergebnisse werden im Rahmen einer Tagung des Deutschen Franchise-Verbandes 
präsentiert werden, zu der Sie eingeladen werden. Ferner veröffentlichen wir nach Auswertung der 
Ergebnisse einen Projektbericht, der Ihnen übermittelt wird. 
 
Im Folgenden nehmen Sie zu Aussagen über verschiedene Bereiche Ihrer Unternehmung Stellung. Bitte 
kreuzen Sie jenes Feld an, das aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) der Unternehmenssituation am besten 
entspricht.  
Hier ist ein BEISPIEL: Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
Trifft teilweise zu Trifft  
vollständig 
zu 
Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig für den Systemerfolg.  1  2  3      4      5    6     7   
Wenn Sie der Meinung sind, dass der Markenname sehr wichtig für den Erfolg ist, dann kreuzen/klicken 
Sie das ganz rechte Feld ‚7‘ (Trifft vollständig zu) an. Umkehrt ist das ganz linke Feld ‚1’ (Trifft 
überhaupt nicht zu) anzukreuzen, wenn Sie der Auffassung sind, dass der Markenname nicht wichtig für 
den Erfolg ist. 
A. Spezifische Fragen zur Wahl der Eigentumsstrategie des Franchisegebers 
In welchem Ausmaß entstehen dem 
FRANCHISENEHMER am Beginn der 
Vertragsbeziehungen Investitionsaufwendungen? 
Überhaupt 
nicht  
Teilweise In sehr 
großem 
Ausmaß 
Aufwendungen für Schulungen am Beginn der 
Vertragsbeziehung. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Aufwendungen für spezifischen technischen und 
organisatorischen Support durch den Franchisegeber. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Aufwendungen für die Ausstattung des Standortes am 
Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
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In welchem Ausmaß entstehen dem 
FRANCHISEGEBER am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung 
Investitionsaufwendungen? 
Überhaupt 
nicht 
Teilweise In sehr 
großem 
Ausmaß 
Aufwendungen für Franchisenehmer-Schulungen am 
Beginn der Geschäftsbeziehung 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Aufwendungen für technische Unterstützung des 
Franchisenehmers am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Aufwendungen für den Aufbau der Organisation des 
lokalen Standortes  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
 
Wenn Sie als Franchisegeber expandieren wollen,  
können Sie folgende EIGENTUMSSTRATEGIEN wählen:  
(a) Eröffnung neuer Franchisenehmer-Standorte und/oder (b) neuer eigener Filialstandorte. 
Bei der Wahl von Franchisenehmer-Standorten können Sie zwei Strategien unterscheiden: 
 
- Single-unit Strategie (der Franchisenehmer ist Eigentümer eines Standortes) 
- Multi-unit Strategie (der Franchisenehmer ist Eigentümer von mindestens zwei Standorten) 
 
 
Worin sehen Sie als Franchisegeber (FG) die Vorteile 
durch Multi-Unit-Franchising (MUF) im Vergleich 
zum Single-Unit-Franchising (SUF)?  
Großer Vorteil 
durch  
 Single-Unit-
Franchising  
Kein 
Unterschied 
zwischen  
MUF und SUF 
Großer Vorteil 
durch  
Multi-Unit-
Franchising 
Größeres lokales Marktwissen  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizientere lokale Serviceleistungen  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Größeres Unternehmenswachstum  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Größere administrative Fähigkeiten  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Mehr organisatorische Innovationen im Franchisesystem 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Schnellere Marktdurchdringung  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizienteres lokales Personalmanagement  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Bessere Qualitätskontrolle 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Mehr Produktinnovationen  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizienterer IT-Einsatz im Franchisesystem  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizienterer Know-how-Transfer zwischen der Zentrale 
und den lokalen Partnern   1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Bessere Zusammenarbeit zwischen Zentrale und den 
lokalen Partnern 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizientere Kontrolle der lokalen Standorte 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Größere Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten bei der Eröffnung 
neuer Standorte  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Geringere Finanzierungskosten  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Nehmen Sie bitte zu folgenden Fragen als 
Franchisegeber Stellung:  
Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
Trifft teilweise zu Trifft 
vollständig 
zu 
Unser Markenname ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren 
Konkurrenten.  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems hat einen sehr 
guten Ruf.  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu 
unseren Konkurrenten.  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen 
Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen.   1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
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3 
Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht zu folgenden 
Aussagen Stellung: 
Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
Trifft teilweise zu Trifft  
vollständig   
zu 
Es herrscht großes Vertrauen zwischen uns und den 
Partnern. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Es herrscht eine Atmosphäre von Offenheit und 
Ehrlichkeit zwischen uns und den Partnern. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Der Informationsaustausch zwischen uns und den Partnern 
geht über das vereinbarte Ausmaß hinaus. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Zusammenarbeit beruht auf partnerschaftlicher Basis. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Personen, denen wir vertrauen, sind jene, mit denen wir 
schon eine längere Beziehung aufgebaut haben. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswürdig. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn 
man ihnen vertraut. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Wie schwierig ist das Know-how des Franchisegebers 
auf den Franchisenehmer in den folgenden Bereichen 
übertragbar? 
Sehr leicht 
zu 
übertragen 
Teilweise 
übertragbar 
Sehr 
schwierig zu 
übertragen 
Markenname 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Marketing-Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Organisatorisches Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Administratives Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Qualitätsmanagement-Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Controlling-Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Human Resources-Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
IT-Know-how 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
In welchem Ausmaß haben Sie im letzten Jahr die 
folgenden Ziele realisiert? 
1-Viel 
schlechter 
als geplant 
4-ca. gleich  
wie  
geplant 
7-Viel besser 
als geplant  
Einsparungen bei den Verwaltungskosten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Systemwachstum 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Bessere Anpassung des Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungs-
programmes an die Kundenwünsche 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizientere Koordination zwischen Zentrale und lokalem 
Standorten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Verringerung der Kosten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7  
Steigerung der Erträge 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Zunahme der Innovationen  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Einsparungen bei den Koordinations- und Kontrollkosten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Höhere Qualität der angebotenen Produkte 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Gewinnwachstum 1  2  3      4      5   6     7  
Worin sehen Sie als Franchisegeber die Vorteile durch 
Franchising im Vergleich zu eigenen Filialbetrieben? 
1-großer 
Vorteil 
durch  
Franchising 
4-kein 
Unter- 
schied 
7-großer 
Vorteil durch 
eigene Filialen  
Größeres lokales Marktwissen 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Bessere Qualitätskontrolle 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Mehr Innovationen 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Geringere Finanzierungskosten bei Expansion 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Größere administrative Fähigkeiten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Effizienteres Human Resources Management 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
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4 
Der Franchisevertrag kann die verschiedenen Aufgabenbereiche der Franchisebeziehung (wie 
z. B. Werbung, Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungsangebot, Betriebsmittelbeschaffung, Festlegung 
der Verkaufspreise, Ausbildung und Anstellung von Mitarbeitern) durch SPEZIFISCHE 
RECHTE und ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE regeln. 
 
     Spezifische Rechte geben im Vertrag genau an, wer unter bestimmten Umständen was zu tun hat  
     (wie z. B. welches Werbematerial bei bestimmten Events zu verwenden ist). 
     Entscheidungsrechte geben im Vertrag genau an, wer über einen bestimmten Sachverhalt zu     
     entscheiden hat (wie z. B. wer über den Einsatz von Werbemaßnahmen oder über die Ausbildung  
     der Mitarbeiter zu entscheiden hat). 
 
Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) 
zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung: 
Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
Trifft 
teilweise zu 
Trifft  
Vollständig 
zu 
Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisegebers werden durch 
ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert 
geregelt. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisegebers werden durch 
SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert 
geregelt. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisenehmers werden 
durch ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE im Vertrag sehr 
detailliert geregelt. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisenehmers werden 
durch SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert 
geregelt. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen uns und den 
Franchisepartnern ist im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) 
zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung: 
Trifft 
überhaupt 
nicht zu 
Trifft teilweise zu Trifft 
vollständig 
zu 
Die Absatzmenge auf den lokalen Standorten ist starken 
Schwankungen unterworfen. 1  2   3      4      5   6     7   
Es ist sehr schwierig, die Marktentwicklung der lokalen 
Standorte zu prognostizieren. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Es ist sehr schwierig, das Verhalten des Standort-
Managers (Franchisenehmer oder Geschäftsführer) zu 
kontrollieren. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Es ist sehr schwierig, die Leistungen des Standort-Mana-
gers (Franchisenehmer oder Geschäftsführer) zu messen. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Es ist sehr schwierig, die Kompetenzen und Fähigkeiten 
des Standortmanagers (Franchisenehmer oder 
Geschäftsführer) zu ermitteln. 
1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Das wirtschaftliche Umfeld auf den lokalen Märkten 
ändert sich rasch. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Die Umsatzprognosen bezüglich der Entwicklung der 
lokalen Standorte sind normalerweise sehr präzise.  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Manchmal gibt der Franchisenehmer relevante 
Informationen nicht an den Franchisegeber weiter. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Franchisenehmer müssen regelmäßig kontrolliert werden, 
um sicherzustellen, dass sie ihre Aufgaben erfüllen. 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
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Datenmaterials können keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Unternehmen gezogen werden. 
5 
Der Franchisevertrag enthält folgende Bestimmungen:  Ja Nein   
Der Franchisenehmer darf neben dem Produktprogramm des Franchisegebers auch 
andere Produkte/Dienstleistungen vertreiben. 
               
  
Der Franchisenehmer muss mehr als 50 % der Betriebsmittel/ Vorprodukte vom 
Franchisegeber oder von vorgegebenen Lieferanten beziehen.                
Der Franchisegeber legt die Verkaufspreise für die vom Franchisenehmer angebotenen 
Produkte/Dienstleistungen unverbindlich fest.                
Das Marktgebiet des Franchisenehmers ist geografisch abgegrenzt (Gebietsschutz-
Klausel).                
Der Franchisenehmer hat einen exklusiven Kundenschutz.                
Der Franchisevertrag enthält eine Wettbewerbsklausel für die Geschäftstätigkeit nach 
Ablauf/Kündigung des Vertrages.                
Der Franchisegeber ist Eigentümer oder Hauptmieter des Standortes des 
Franchisebetriebes.                
Der Franchisegeber hat vertragliche Optionsrechte bei Veräußerung des  
Franchisebetriebes durch den Franchisenehmer (z.B. Vorkaufsrecht).                
Der Franchisebetrieb ist vererbbar.                
 
 In welchem Ausmaß entscheidet der Franchisenehmer 
über folgende Bereiche? 
Überhaupt 
nicht 
teilweise In sehr 
großem 
Ausmaß  
Durchführung von Investitionsprojekten am lokalen 
Standort 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Finanzierung von lokalen Investitionsprojekten 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Auswahl von Lieferanten  1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Anstellung von Mitarbeitern am lokalen Standort 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Ausbildung der Mitarbeiter am lokalen Standort 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungsangebot am lokalen Markt 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Verkaufspreise am lokalen Standort 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Einsatz von Werbe- und Verkaufsförderungsmaßnahmen 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Ausstattung des Franchisenehmer-Standortes 1  2  3      4      5   6     7  
Beschaffung der Betriebsmittel/Vorprodukte 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Einführung neuer Produkte am lokalen Markt 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
Einsatz des Controllingsystems am lokalen Standort 1  2  3      4      5   6     7   
 
B. Bitte machen Sie folgende Angaben zu Ihrem Unternehmen: 
Welche Art von Franchising betreibt Ihr Unternehmen? 
 
 Produktion                                   Vertrieb                            Dienstleistung 
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der firmeneigenen Filialstandorte in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?      
 
Anzahl: _____________ 
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der Franchisenehmer-Standorte in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?                     
                                                      
Anzahl:  
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der Franchisenehmer in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?                
                                                             
Anzahl:                           
Wann wurde der erste Franchisebetrieb in Deutschland eröffnet?  
Jahr:                                                                                         
 
Geben Sie die Anzahl der Mitarbeiter 
in der Systemzentrale an? 
Anzahl:  
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Wie hoch ist die fixe Einstiegsgebühr des Franchisenehmers zu Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung (in 
EUR)?  
Betrag in EUR: ________________                 
Wie hoch sind die durchschnittlichen Investitionskosten (ohne Einstiegsgebühr) des 
Franchisenehmers am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung? 
 
Betrag:  _________________  
 
Wovon hängt die laufende variable Gebühr ab? 
 Fixer Betrag   Umsatz    Gewinn    Andere Größen: Welche? _________________________ 
 
Wie hoch ist diese laufende variable Gebühr? 
 
Prozentsatz :  ________________                      oder Betrag:  ________________ 
 
Wird zusätzlich eine Werbe- bzw. Marketinggebühr verrechnet? 
 
Ja         Nein  
       Wovon hängt diese ab?  Umsatz                   Andere Größen: Welche? __________________ 
 
Wie hoch ist diese Werbe- bzw. Marketinggebühr? 
 
Prozentsatz  ____________ 
oder Betrag:  ____________ 
 
Wie lange ist die vertragliche Laufzeit des Franchisevertrages? 
Anzahl der Jahre:   
 
Wie oft finden formelle Treffen zwischen Franchisegeber und Franchisenehmer (wie Tagungen, 
Ausschüsse) pro Jahr statt?  
Anzahl:  
 
Wie oft finden Besuche des Franchisegebers beim Franchisenehmer statt? 
 
Anzahl: __________________ 
Laufende Schulung: An wie vielen Tagen pro Jahr wird der Franchisenehmer vom Franchisegeber 
besucht?  
 
Anzahl der Tage: ______________ 
 
An wie vielen Tagen pro Jahr werden die Mitarbeiter des Franchisenehmers geschult? 
 
Anzahl der Tage: ______________ 
Grundschulung: Wie viele Tage dauert die Grundausbildung und praktische Schulung des 
Franchisenehmers vor Eröffnung eines Franchisebetriebes? 
 
Anzahl der Tage: ______________ 
 
Wir möchten uns für Ihre freundliche Unterstützung recht herzlich bedanken. Bei Interesse 
übermitteln wir Ihnen nach Abschluss der Untersuchung gerne die Ergebnisse. Bitte geben 
Sie hier Ihre Email-Adresse an: 
 
Bitte übermitteln Sie den ausgefüllten Fragebogen an: 
UNIV. PROF. DR. JOSEF WINDSPERGER (UNIVERSITÄT WIEN) 
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSZENTRUM 
UNIVERSITÄT WIEN 
BRÜNNERSTR. 72, A–1210 WIEN 
TEL. 0043-1-4277-38180; FAX: 0043-1-4277-38174 
E-Mail: josef.windsperger@univie.ac.at 
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13. 	  Abstract	  (English)	  
In this thesis a first attempt is made in order to apply the real options approach to 
franchising. The aim of the theoretical and empirical investigations is to identify driving 
factors for the existence of real option clauses in franchising contracts.  
Originating in financial options theory, the real options approach bares on essential 
advantage: the integration of uncertainty to the strategic framework. As firms are 
confronted with differing uncertainties and an uncertain future, options theory represents a 
way to embed uncertainty as an opportunity. It is not the uncertainty per se, but rather the 
cognition that uncertainty involves the possibility of flexibility, which adds value to the 
firm. An option is defined as the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specific asset 
on or before a specified point in time to ex ante précised conditions. The option holder 
profits from the opportunity to decide flexibly. This re- and proactive approach adds value 
to the firm, as the integration of newly gathered information can ameliorate the decision 
making process. In opposition to financial options, the underlying asset of real options 
represents a potential physical or intellectual investment. One basic prediction of the real 
option approach, in respect to strategic management, is that the firm’s value is not only 
determined by its present or intrinsic value but also by the additional time value, which can 
be gained by recognizing and exploiting future opportunities for the firm. The options 
value is supposed to change over time, following a random walk, and is assumed to be 
higher when the volatility of the underlying asset’s value increases.  
In dependence on conducted research for joint ventures as real options (Kogut 1991, Chi/ 
McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, etc.), franchising is going to be assumed as 
a form of sequential market entry, and therefore operates as a real option to defer 
immediate acquisition of a local partner. Following this logic franchising might be seen as 
a real option to expand, hence a real growth option. Despite the need to analyse franchising 
itself as a real option, which would require a wider range of available data and qualitative 
research, this thesis focuses specifically on real option clauses in franchising contracts. The 
option clause stipulates the right to the option. In respect to real option theory, option 
clauses, such as for instance an option-to- acquire-clause, represent the contractual 
recorded arrangement between the franchising partners. The option holder obtains the right 
but not the obligation to exploit future opportunities. Therefore the option clause can be 
seen as the legally binding implementation of a real option. Consequently the clause is an 
instrument for a firm to assure a claim on future opportunities. The occurrence or absence 
of such option clauses in franchising contracts might give hints to the intentions of the 
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contractual partners, as well as have implications on partners’ incentives.  
The thesis concentrates on explicit option clauses in franchising contracts, and is structured 
in a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical part provides an overview of the 
most important real options principles and presents hypotheses, derived in analogy to real 
options considerations in alliances (joint ventures, licensing). In the second part of the 
thesis, the hypotheses are tested statistically. The data for the statistical analysis stems 
from the research project „Eigentumsstrategie von Franchise- Unternehmen in 
Deutschland“, conducted by ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Josef Windsperger. A questionnaire 
has been given to German franchising firms in order to analyse the factors influencing the 
choice of ownership strategy of the franchisor. The results show a negative relationship 
between the likelihood of the usage of an option clause and perceived environmental 
uncertainty. Hence the hypotheses, derived from theory, could not be supported for 
franchising with the available data. However, the real options approach seems to be a 
promising concept to explain managerial strategy and investment decisions, as real options 
theory incorporates uncertainty as an opportunity into the model. Future research should 
focus in particular on combined approaches and should conceive real options approach as 
an extension to theories, such as transaction cost theory or resource- based view. 
14. Abstract	  (German)	  	  
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit stellt einen ersten Versuch dar, den Realoptionsansatz auf 
Franchising anzuwenden. Das Ziel der theoretischen und empirischen Untersuchung ist es, 
ausschlaggebende Faktoren für die Existenz von Realoptionsklauseln in Franchising 
Verträgen zu identifizieren. 
Der Realoptionsansatz, welcher seinen Ursprung in der Finanzoptionstheorie hat, 
beinhaltet einen essentiellen Vorteil: die Integration von Unsicherheit in das strategische 
Model. Nachdem Unternehmen mit verschiedenen Arten von Unsicherheit und einer 
unsicheren Zukunft konfrontiert sind, eröffnet die Optionstheorie einen Weg die 
Unsicherheit als Chance in das Model einzugliedern. Hierbei ist nicht die Unsicherheit per 
se das wertsteigernde Element für ein Unternehmen,  sondern vielmehr die Erkenntnis, 
dass Unsicherheit verbunden ist mit der Möglichkeit auf Flexibilität. Eine Option ist 
definiert als das Recht, und nicht die Pflicht, einen bestimmten Posten beziehungsweise 
Vermögenswert zu kaufen oder zu verkaufen, an einem oder vor einem im Voraus 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt, zu ex ante spezifizierten Konditionen. Der Optionsinhaber profitiert 
von der Möglichkeit flexibel entscheiden zu können. Dieser auf Reaktion und Aktion 
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gerichtete Ansatz verschafft dem Unternehmen zusätzlichen Wert, da die Integration von 
neu gewonnenen Wissen und Informationen den Entscheidungsprozess verbessert. Die der 
Option zugrundeliegende Anlage stellt bei Realoptionen, im Gegensatz zu Finanzoptionen, 
ein potentielles physisches oder intellektuelles Investment dar. Eine der grundsätzlichen 
Annahmen des Realoptionsansatzes, in Bezug auf strategisches Management,  ist jene, 
dass der Unternehmenswert nicht nur durch den gegenwärtigen Wert, sondern zusätzlich 
durch den zukünftigen Wert definiert ist. Dieser zukünftige Wert kann vom Unternehmen 
erlangt werden, durch das Erkennen und das Nutzen von zukünftigen Chancen. Es wird 
angenommen, dass der Wert einer Option sich über die Zeit verändert, und zwar einer 
Zufallsbewegung folgend, die als Random- Walk bezeichnet wird. Einer weiteren 
Annahme zufolge steigt der Wert einer Option mit der Erhöhung der Volatilität des Wertes 
der zugrundeliegenden Anlage. 
In Anlehnung an bereits durchgeführte Forschungen, Joint Ventures (Kogut 1991, Chi/ 
McGuire 1996, Folta 1998, Reuer/ Tong 2005, etc.) betreffend, wird Franchising als eine 
Form von sequentiellem Markeintritt gesehen, und repräsentiert somit eine Realoption, die 
unmittelbare Akquisition eines lokalen Partner zu verschieben. Dieser Logik folgend, kann 
Franchising als Realoption zu Expandieren wahrgenommen werden, also eine Realoption 
zu Wachsen. Ungeachtet der Notwendigkeit Franchising an sich als Realoption zu 
analysieren, was eine ausgedehntere Menge an verfügbaren Daten und qualitative 
Forschung erfordern würde, beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Diplomarbeit speziell mit 
Realoptionsklauseln in Franchising Verträgen. Die Realoptionsklausel schreibt das Recht 
auf die Option fest. In Bezug auf die Realoptionstheorie repräsentieren Optionsklauseln, 
wie zum Beispiel das Vorkaufsrecht, vertraglich aufgezeichnete Vereinbarungen der 
beiden Franchising Partner. Der Optionsinhaber erhält das Recht, jedoch nicht die Pflicht, 
zukünftige Chancen auszunutzen. In diesem Sinne kann eine Realoptionsklausel als 
rechtlich bindende Durchführung einer Realoption gesehen werden. Folglich ist eine 
Optionsklausel für ein Unternehmen ein Instrument zur Sicherung des Anspruches auf 
zukünftige Möglichkeiten. Das Auftreten oder Fehlen von Optionsklauseln in Franchising 
Verträgen könnte sowohl Hinweise auf die Absichten der Vertragspartner geben, als auch 
Auswirkungen auf die Motivation der Partner haben. 
Thema der Diplomarbeit sind explizite Optionsklauseln in Franchising Verträgen. Die 
Arbeit ist in folgendermaßen strukturiert: ein theoretischer wird gefolgt von einem 
empirischen Teil. Der theoretische Teil gibt einen Überblick, die wichtigsten 
Realoptionskonzepte betreffend, und stellt Hypothesen vor, welche in Analogie zur 
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bestehenden Forschung des Realoptionsansatzes in Allianzen (Joint Ventures, Licensing) 
gebildet werden. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit werden die Hypothesen statistisch getestet. 
Die Daten für die statistische Analyse stammen vom Forschungsprojekt 
„Eigentumsstrategie von Franchise- Unternehmen in Deutschland“, welches von ao. Univ.-
Prof. Mag. Dr. Josef Windsperger durchgeführt wurde. Ein Fragebogen wurde an deutsche 
Franchising Unternehmen gesandt, um die Einflussfaktoren bei der Wahl der 
Eigentumsstrategie von Franchiseunternehmen aus der Sicht des Franchisegebers  zu 
untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine negative Beziehung zwischen der 
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Verwendung einer Optionsklausel und der wahrgenommenen 
umweltbedingten Unsicherheit. Somit können die Hypothesen, welche aus der Theorie 
abgeleitet wurden, für Franchising mit den vorhandenen Daten nicht bestätigt werden. 
Dennoch scheint der Realoptionsansatz ein vielversprechendes Konzept zu sein, um 
geschäftsführende Strategien und Investment Entscheidungen zu erklären, da die 
Realoptionstheorie Unsicherheit als Chance in das Model eingliedert. Die zukünftige 
Forschung sollte besonders auf die Kombination von verschiedenen theoretischen 
Ansätzen eingehen, und den Realoptionsansatz als Erweiterung von bestehenden Theorien 
(z.B.: Transaktionskostentheorie, Ressourcentheorie) begreifen.  
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15. 	  Curriculum	  Vitae	  
 
  
 
  
 
Europass 
Lebenslauf  
 
  
 
 
  
Angaben zur Person   
Nachname / Vorname Brix Angelika 
  
Staatsangehörigkeit Österreich 
  
  
Geschlecht Weiblich 
  
  
Berufserfahrung  
  
Daten Von 2005- 2012, zuletzt 09. 01 - 31. 03. 2012 
Beruf oder Funktion Sachbearbeiterin Geschäftsführung, Sachbearbeiterin Rechtsabteilung 
Wichtigste Tätigkeiten und 
Zuständigkeiten 
Administration, Datenbankbearbeitung, Projektmitarbeit 
Name und Adresse des 
Arbeitgebers 
Dorotheum GmbH & Co KG, Dorotheergasse 17, 1010 Wien  
Tel.: +43-1-515 60-0, Fax: +43-1-515 60-443  
Tätigkeitsbereich oder 
Branche 
Kunstmarkt, Auktionsbetrieb 
  
Schul- und 
Berufsbildung 
 
  
Daten Seit WS 2005 Studium der Internationalen Betriebswirtschaft (IBW) und 
Kunstgeschichte 
 
Bezeichnung der 
erworbenen Qualifikation 
Matura 2005, Sacré Coeur Pressbaum, Schwerpunkt Europaklasse 
Hauptfächer/berufliche 
Fähigkeiten 
Spezialisierung in IBW auf International Management und International Marketing 
Name und Art der Bildungs- 
oder Ausbildungseinrichtung 
Universität Wien, Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring 1 , 1010 Wien 
  
Das Bild kann nicht angezeigt 
werden. Dieser Computer verfügt 
möglicherweise über zu wenig 
Arbeitsspeicher, um das Bild zu 
öffnen, oder das Bild ist beschädigt. 
Starten Sie den Computer neu, und 
öffnen Sie dann erneut die Datei. 
Wenn weiterhin das rote x angezeigt 
wird, müssen Sie das Bild 
möglicherweise löschen und dann 
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Persönliche 
Fähigkeiten und 
Kompetenzen 
 
  
Muttersprache Deutsch 
  
Sonstige Sprache(n) Englisch, Französisch, Spanisch, Italienisch, Latein 
Selbstbeurteilung  Verstehen Sprechen Schreiben 
Europäische 
Kompetenzstufe (*) 
 Hören Lesen An Gesprächen 
teilnehmen 
Zusammen-
hängendes 
Sprechen 
 
Englisch  
C2  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C2  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C1  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C2  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C2  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
Französisch  
C1  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C1  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
 B2  
Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
B2  
Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
C1  
Kompetente 
Sprach-
verwendung  
Spanisch  B1  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
B1  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A2 Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A2  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
B1  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
Italienisch  B1  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
B1  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A2  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A2  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A2  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
Latein  A2  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
B2  Selbständige 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A1  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A1  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
A1  Elementare 
Sprach-
verwendung  
 (*)  Referenzniveau des gemeinsamen europäischen Referenzrahmens 
  
Soziale Fähigkeiten und 
Kompetenzen  
Kommunikativ, Weltoffen, Flexibel, Team-orientiert  
  
IKT-Kenntnisse und 
Kompetenzen 
Microsoft Office Programme (Word, Excel, Power Point, Outlook), SPSS (Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences) 20.0, Mac OS X Lion 10.7.4 
  
Sonstige Fähigkeiten und 
Kompetenzen 
Hobbys: Volleyball, Gitarre, Tanzen, Lesen, Reisen 
  
Führerschein Klasse B 
  
  
  
 	  
